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I. INTRODUCTION
Public and private sector employers, often acting unilaterally,
have responded to the increased use of drugs and alcohol in the work-
place by implementing substance detection programs.' Inevitably, the
implementation of these programs pits the interests of employers and
society in a drug free work environment against the privacy interests
of employees.2
The way courts and arbitrators respond when management uni-
laterally implements an employee drug testing program, either as a
new program or as an addition to an existing substance abuse policy,
1. Courts and arbitrators have both observed this marked increase in drug use. As one
federal judge stated:
The prevention of illicit drug use has become a major national concern.
Congress has appropriated unprecedented sums to interdict drug smuggling, the
President has issued an executive order requiring all federal agencies to adopt
programs that will eliminate drugs from the federal workplace, and hundreds of
private employers, including more than a quarter of the Fortune 500 companies,
have instituted some kind of program for urinalysis testing of employees.
Employee drug use costs the United States an estimated $33 billion per year.
The seriousness of the problem has led to efforts to combat drug use by the use of
novel methods, such as compulsory testing.
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 172-73 (5th Cir. 1987) (foot-
notes omitted), aff'd in part and modified in part, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989). Similarly, one
arbitrator noted: "Both drug and alcohol abuse are rampant in America and are a major indus-
trial problem, adversely affecting productivity growth, which is in turn the basis for real
increases in worker income." South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 845, 849
(1987) (Boals, Arb.).
2. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 279.
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can be described in terms of entitlement theory.3 If a judge or arbitra-
tor allows management to impose a drug testing program on employ-
ees without bargaining before implementation, then management has
the entitlement to unilaterally implement such a program. If a judge
or arbitrator voids the program and holds that employees shall be free
from having to submit to a management imposed drug test, then the
employees have the entitlement not to be forced to submit to an
imposed nonconsensual drug test.4
An entitlement that radically favored management would allow
management to subject all employees to drug tests randomly, at any
time and at any place, regardless of cause and without requiring man-
agement either to bargain with the employees or to obtain their con-
sent. An entitlement that radically favored employees would not
allow management to test employees for drugs without either the vol-
untary, noncoerced consent of the employee or without a collective
bargaining agreement that allowed the testing. Judicial and arbitral
opinions place the entitlement somewhere between these two
extremes. Management imposed drug testing schemes have varied
widely, including: testing based upon individualized suspicion;' ran-
dom or surprise testing absent individualized suspicion;6 testing with
less than individualized suspicion pursuant to either a regularly
scheduled job physical or other specific event that is tied to safety
concerns;' and testing absent individualized suspicion in work settings
3. Under entitlement theory, if management has the unequivocal right to test employees
for drug use, then employees who value the right to be free from drug testing must bargain
with management and give something up in exchange for the right not to be tested.
Conversely, if unions have the right not to have employees subjected to drug testing absent
voluntary consent, then management that seeks to test its employees for drugs must bargain
for the entitlement and give something up. See generally Schwab, Collective Bargaining and
the Coase Theorem, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 245 (1987) (discussing entitlement theory).
4. See id.
5. See, e.g., Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (testing of
electric line workers who were directly observed smoking marijuana was reasonable); Citgo
Petroleum Corp., 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 521 (1986) (Allen, Arb.) (drug testing at a petroleum
facility after direct observation of a confused, stumbling, unsteady employee with slurred
speech and blinking eyes was reasonable).
6. See, e.g., Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 844 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1988)
(Nuclear power is a highly regulated industry, and it was reasonable to randomly test certain
employees with access to critical areas.); International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union
No. 647, 87-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) T 8570 (1987) (Weisbrod, Arb.) (It is reasonable to
randomly test nuclear power plant workers who have access to sensitive areas.).
7. See, e.g., Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335, 341 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (testing bus drivers
and attendants of handicapped school children during a "routine . . . employment-related
medical examination" was reasonable), vacated sub nom. Jenkins v. Jones, 109 S. Ct. 1633
(1989), replaced, 878 F.2d 1476 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (affirming and modifying its earlier decision);
Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264, 1267 (7th Cir.) (reasonable
to test bus drivers involved in a serious accident), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976); Concrete
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that have a strong impact on public health and safety.8
The General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB" or "Board") has declared the imposition of any drug test-
ing program to be a mandatory subject of bargaining under the
National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA" or "Act"). 9 Accordingly,
without employee consent or a clear and unequivocal waiver,' 0 man-
agement's imposition of a drug testing scheme without first bargaining
to impasse" may violate the NLRA. 12 The Board has recently
Pipe Prods. Co., 87 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 601 (1986) (Caraway, Arb.) (reasonable to test any
driver of a tractor-trailer involved in an accident).
8. See, e.g., Transport Workers' Union, Local 234 v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 863
F.2d 1110 (3d Cir. 1988) (SEPTA) (random testing of transit operators for public safety
reasons was upheld), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 109 S. Ct. 3208 (1989);
Mullholland v. Department of the Army, 660 F. Supp. 1565 (E.D. Va. 1987) (random testing
of certain civilians that were responsible for maintaining helicopters involved with national
security was reasonable); South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 845 (1987)
(Boals, Arb.) (reasonable to randomly test public bus drivers).
9. The NLRB General Counsel, appointed by the President with the approval of the
Senate, is empowered to investigate and prosecute violations of unfair labor practices under the
National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982)) (NLRA). See R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 7
(1985). As such, it can be inferred that the General Counsel's Advice Memorandums would
have a persuasive effect on the NLRB. In a recent Advice Memorandum, the General Counsel
stated that:
(1) [D]rug testing for current employees and job applicants is a mandatory
subject of bargaining under Section 8(d) of the [NLRA]; (2) in general,
implementation of a drug testing program is a substantial change in working
conditions, even where physical examinations previously have been given, and
even if established work rules preclude the use or possession of drugs in the plant;
(3) the established Board policy that a union's waiver of its bargaining rights
must be clear and unmistakable is to be applied to drug testing; (4) normal Board
deferral policies under Dubo and Collyer will apply to these cases; however, if
Section 10(j) relief is otherwise warranted, deferral will not be appropriate.
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 184, at D-1 (Sept. 24, 1987) (citing Collyer Wire, 192 N.L.R.B.
837 (1971); Dubo Mfg. Corp., 142 N.L.R.B. 431 (1963)).
10. See Laidlaw Transit, 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1001, 1019 (1987) (Allen, Arb.). The
arbitrator stated:
General Counsel Collyer discounted claims by employers that a union has
waived its negotiating rights per a zipper clause, past practice, or a management
rights provision. Instead Collyer contends that any such waiver regarding drug
testing procedures must be clearly expressed in agreement language, or that past
negotiations reveal that the subject matter was specifically discussed and was
"consciously yielded" by the union.
Id.
11. Impasse occurs when parties bargaining in good faith have become deadlocked over
the issue in dispute. Once impasse is reached, the employer may impose any changes that have
been previously offered to the union. Either party may discontinue further negotiations at that
point. A party bargaining to good faith impasse avoids violating Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA.
See NLRA § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5); R. GORMAN, supra note 9, at 445-50.
12. Section (8)(a)(5) of the NLRA states: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer ... to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject
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affirmed this position in Johnson Bateman Co., 13 holding that drug
testing is a mandatory subject of bargaining under Section 8(a)(5) of
the Act.'4 The NLRB stated that "the drug/alcohol testing require-
ment [imposed by the employer is] both germane to the working envi-
ronment, and outside the scope of managerial decisions lying at the
core of entrepreneurial control."' 5 In practice, however, employers
have not followed the General Counsel's Advice Memorandum;
instead, they have implemented drug testing programs unilaterally
during the terms of existing collective bargaining agreements, thereby
causing the unions to seek outside judicial and arbitral relief.'6
In contrast to the NLRB's position giving employees the entitle-
ment not to be subjected to management imposed drug testing absent
a contractual waiver, the United States Supreme Court in three recent
opinions has effectively given management the entitlement to unilater-
ally impose drug testing upon employees in certain work environ-
ments. In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association,'7 the
Court upheld management's right to unilaterally impose drug testing
upon railroad operating employees that have been in an accident,
regardless of individualized reasonable suspicion.'" Similarly, in
to the provisions of section 9(a)." NLRA § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5). In addition, in
NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962), the Supreme Court stated:
The duty to "bargain collectively" enjoined by § 8(a)(5) is defined by § 8(d) as
the duty to "meet... and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment." . . . We hold that an employer's
unilateral change in conditions of employment under negotiation is similarly a
violation of § 8(a)(5), for it is a circumvention of the duty to negotiate which
frustrates the objectives of § 8(a)(5) much as does a flat refusal.
Id. at 742-43.
13. Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 117, at F-1 (June 20, 1989).
14. Id. at F-2. In that case, a concrete pipe manufacturer unilaterally implemented a drug
and alcohol testing program for all employees who are injured on the job. Id. The
administrative law judge held that the program of testing involved a "work rule" and not a
"Company rule" in which the union had not contractually waived its rights; thus, the
company's implementation without first bargaining with the union violated Section 8(a)(5) of
the NLRA. Id. The NLRB affirmed. Id. at F-5.
15. Id. at F-2. The Board analogized its earlier decisions in which it held that both
physical examinations and polygraph testing are mandatory subjects of bargaining. Id.
16. See, e.g., Bangert v. Hodel, 705 F. Supp. 643 (D.D.C. 1989) (The Department of
Interior unilaterally implemented a random drug testing program for approximately a quarter
of its employees where no prior drug abuse was shown.); Department of the Army, 91 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 137, 138 (1988) (Huffcut, Arb.) (The Army unilaterally implemented a random
drug testing program for certain of its civilian personnel at an Army facility where no prior
evidence of drug abuse was shown.).
17. 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
18. Id. at 1422. The Court focused on both the importance of public safety and confidence
involving railroads and the operating employees' diminished expectation of privacy by virtue
of their positions. Id.
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National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab 19, the Court upheld
management imposed drug testing of all employees entering certain
positions within the United States Customs Service.2" The Supreme
Court in these cases gave great deference to the need for public confi-
dence in these industries and to the compelling need to promote gen-
eral public safety; the Court found that these needs outweighed
employee privacy concerns. 2' Finally, in Consolidated Rail Corp. v.
Railway Labor Executives' Association,22 the Court held that manage-
ment imposed drug testing of all railroad employees during their
physical examinations is a "minor dispute" under the Railway Labor
Act,23 thus allowing the dispute to be decided by an arbitration
adjustment board.24 Because these decisions will guide lower federal
courts toward upholding management imposed drug testing programs
when public policy issues are implicated, their impact will likely be
reflected in forthcoming arbitration opinions.
This Comment examines the values that inform the decisions of
arbitrators confronted with the issue of where to place the entitlement
when employees are subjected to management imposed drug testing.
Section II focuses on the backdrop of federal precedent in the area of
drug testing in the public sector. Section III looks at what arbitrators
have decided when confronted with situations in which management
unilaterally imposes drug testing on employees. Section IV reasons
that arbitrators implicitly and explicitly exhibit many of the same val-
ues displayed by their judicial counterparts in balancing the personal
privacy and dignity of the employee against concerns for a safe and
healthy workplace. Finally, Section V concludes that arbitrators will
continue to follow federal precedent in resolving drug testing issues-
a body of law that is shifting away from individual rights and toward
public concerns.
19. 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
20. Id. at 1387-98. In this case, the Court emphasized the public importance of the
maintenance of the integrity of our borders and the maintenance of public safety by those
Customs employees carrying firearms; as a result, it held that it was reasonable under the
fourth amendment to subject these employees to drug testing although individualized
suspicion was lacking. Id.
21. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1422; Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1393-95.
22. 109 S. Ct. 2477 (1989).
23. Id. at 2479-80.
24. Id. at 2480-81. In the case of "minor disputes," there is no general requirement to
maintain the status quo pending resolution of an adjustment board's decision, but the courts
may grant injunctive relief to prohibit employees from striking during this period. Id. In the
case of "major disputes," however, the parties must go through a time consuming process of
"bargaining and mediation" during which they must maintain the status quo. Id. at 2480.
1989]
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II. THE PUBLIC SECTOR: DRUG TESTING AND THE COURTS
Unlike their private sector counterparts, public sector employees
are protected from having their employers unilaterally act in a way
that may infringe upon their constitutional rights. Public employees
have challenged management imposed drug testing under theories of
unreasonable search and seizure," procedural and substantive due
25. See generally Bible, Employee Urine Testing and the Fourth Amendment, 38 LAB. L.J.
611, 617-40 (1987) (discussing fourth amendment issues applicable to drug testing); Survey,
Survey of the Law on Employee Drug Testing, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 553, 567-609 (1988)
(discussing the constitutional implications of employee drug testing); Note, Mandatory Drug
Testing of Public Sector Employees: Constitutional Implications, 65 U. DET. L. REV. 315, 315-
31 (1988) (discussing constitutional issues of employee drug testing).
26. E.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1407 (1989);
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1389 (1989); Harmon v.
Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Transport Workers' Union, Local 234 v.
Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 863 F.2d 1110, 1115 (3d Cir. 1988) (SEPTA), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 109 S. Ct. 3208 (1989); Policeman's Benevolent Ass'n of N.J. v.
Township of Wash., 850 F.2d 133, 134 (3d Cir. 1988); Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist.,
844 F.2d 562, 566 (8th Cir. 1988); Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335, 337 (D.C. Cir. 1987),
vacated sub nom. Jenkins v. Jones, 109 S. Ct. 1633 (1989), replaced, 878 F.2d 1476 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (affirming and modifying its earlier decision); National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v.
Weinberger, 818 F.2d 935, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1987); McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302, 1305
(8th Cir. 1987); Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1141 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
986 (1986); Division 241 A'malgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264, 1266 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976); see also National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Cheney,
884 F.2d 603 (D.C. Cir. 1989), modifying National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Carlucci, 690
F. Supp. 46 (D.D.C. 1988); Bangert v. Hodel, 705 F. Supp. 643 (D.D.C. 1989); Owner-
Operators Indep. Drivers Ass'n v. Burnley, 705 F. Supp. 481 (N.D. Cal. 1989); Ensor v. Rust
Eng'g Co., 704 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Tenn. 1989); Weicks v. New Orleans Police Dep't,. 706 F.
Supp. 453 (E.D. La. 1988), aff'd mem., 868 F.2d 1269 (5th Cir. 1989); National Air Traffic
Controllers Ass'n v. Burnley, 700 F. Supp. 1043 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Ford v. Dowd, 697 F. Supp.
1085 (E.D. Mo. 1988); Amalgamated Transit Union Div. 1279 v. Cambria County Transit
Auth., 691 F. Supp. 898, 899 (W.D. Pa. 1988); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Council
33 v. Meese, 688 F. Supp. 547, 548 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Poole v. Stephens, 688 F. Supp. 149
(D.N.J. 1988); Guiney v. Roache, 686 F. Supp. 956 (D. Mass. 1988), vacated and remanded,
873 F.2d 1557 (1st Cir. 1989); Thomson v. Weinberger, 682 F. Supp. 829 (D. Md. 1988), rev'd
sub nom. Thomson v. Marsh, 878 F.2d 1431 (4th Cir. 1989); Burka v. New York City Transit
Auth., 680 F. Supp. 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Wrightsell v. City of Chicago, 678 F. Supp. 727
(N.D. Ill. 1988); Uniform Div. Officers Ass'n Local 17 v. Brady, No. 88-3377 (D.D.C. Dec. 23,
1988) (WESTLAW, Allfeds library); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Dole, 670 F.
Supp. 445, 447 (D.D.C. 1987); Taylor v. O'Grady, 669 F. Supp. 1422 (N.D. Ill. 1987);
Mullholland v. Department of the Army, 660 F. Supp. 1565 (E.D. Va. 1987); Lovvorn v. City
of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Tenn. 1986), aff'd, 846 F.2d 1539 (6th Cir.), vacated
on reh'g, 861 F.2d 1388 (6th Cir. 1988); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J.
1986); Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
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process,2 7 equal protection,28 self-incrimination,29 the right of pri-
vacy,30 and even infringement of religion.3" This Comment focuses on
the fourth amendment's right against unreasonable search and
seizure 32 and, to a lesser extent, on the fourteenth amendment's guar-
antee of due process. 33 Together, these two rights represent the major-
ity of constitutional challenges to drug testing.
27. E.g., Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 181 (5th Cir. 1987) (The procedures utilized in testing,
storing, and handling plaintiff's urinalysis sample did not violate due process.), modified on
other grounds, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989); Burka, 680 F. Supp. at 610-11. (Applicants for
employment do not have a protected property right, and those employees' due process rights
are satisfied by fair hearings and accurate drug tests.); Lovvorn, 647 F. Supp. at 883 (Municipal
firefighters have a property interest in their jobs and a liberty interest in their reputation, and
they are procedurally entitled to know the charges against them.), aff'd, 846 F.2d 1539 (6th
Cir.), vacated on reh'g, 861 F.2d 1388 (6th Cir. 1988); Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1520-21 (Civil
servants have a protected property interest in their jobs, and their government employer
violated these interests without due process by failing to give prior notice and an opportunity
to be heard.); Allen, 601 F. Supp. at 495 (City employees were given a "full and fair hearing"
on the reasons for their discharge and were not deprived of procedural or substantive due
process.).
28. E.g., Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1143 (subjecting only'jockeys-not trainers, grooms, or
officials-to random testing did not violate the equal protection clause); Poole, 688 F. Supp. at
156 (court rejected plaintiff's equal protection challenge that only recruits were subjected to
random testing while neither regular guards nor similarly situated civilians were tested);
Burka, 680 F. Supp. at 601-03 (alcohol and drug users are not similarly situated, therefore
equal protection claims are precluded).
29. E.g., Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 181 (The court held that the employee's fifth amendment
rights were not violated.), modified on other grounds, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989); Burka, 680 F.
Supp. at 611 (Results from urinalysis are not testimonial evidence and hence are not violative
of the fifth amendment.); Rushton, 653 F. Supp. 1510, 1528 (D. Neb. 1987) (A urine sample is
neither testimonial nor communicative and hence is not protected by the fifth amendment
right against self-incrimination.), aff'd, 844 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1988). The courts relied on the
Supreme Court decision of Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), which held that the
drawing of blood is neither protected speech nor writing.
30. E.g., Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 591 (9th Cir. 1988)
(finding a privacy right to have "certain information about drug use private," but because the
employees' confidentiality had not yet been violated, the issue was not "ripe" for disposition),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402
(1989); Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1144 (employee's privacy right was not violated because
regulations provided for confidentiality of test results); Burka, 680 F. Supp. at 606 (privacy
claims were not "ripe" for adjudication); Rushton, 653 F. Supp. at 1528 (privacy claims were
without merit because the giving of the test samples was not witnessed and the test results were
not disclosed), aff'd, 844 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1988).
31. In Rushton, the plaintiffs asserted that the drug testing program challenged their free
exercise of religion because the program classified alcoholism as a disease rather than a sin,
thereby imposing a heretical idea on them. 653 F. Supp. at 1519. They argued that this
classification put them at odds with God, the Bible, and the elders of their church; moreover, it
questioned their personal integrity. Id. The court acknowledged that although the programs
might burden plaintiffs' religious practice, "either program is the least restrictive alternative
available to [the government employer] to satisfy its compelling interest in assuring the health
and welfare of the public and its employees." Id. at 1516.
32. See supra note 26.
33. See supra note 27.
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A. Reasonableness Under the Fourth Amendment
The fourth amendment requires that all searches conducted by
the government be reasonable. 3" Federal courts have agreed that drug
testing is a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment.35 In
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,36 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit characterized urinalysis as a
search under the fourth amendment because it infringes upon the
employee's reasonable expectation of privacy.3 7 As the court stated:
"There are few activities in our society more personal or private than
the passing of urine. "38
A search must be reasonable in order to comport with the fourth
amendment because only "unreasonable" searches are prohibited.39
In determining the reasonableness of a search absent a warrant by a
neutral magistrate, the federal courts perform a balancing test that is
exemplified by the Supreme Court in Von Raab:
[O]ur cases establish that where a Fourth Amendment intrusion
serves special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, it is necessary to balance the individual's privacy
expectations against the Government's interests to determine
whether it is impractical to require a warrant or some level of indi-
vidualized suspicion in the particular context. 4°
34. The fourth amendment states that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
35. E.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1413 (1989). In
Skinner, the Court stated: "Because it is clear that the collection and testing of urine intrudes
upon expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable, the Federal
Courts of Appeals have concluded unanimously, and we agree, that these intrusions must be
deemed searches under the Fourth Amendment." Id.; accord National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1390 (1989); see also Transport Workers' Union, Local
234 v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 863 F.2d 1110, 1115 (3d Cir. 1988) (SEPTA), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 109 S. Ct. 3208 (1989); Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power
Dist., 844 F.2d 562, 566 (8th Cir. 1988); Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335, 338 (D.C. Cir.
1987), vacated sub nom. Jenkins v. Jones, 109 S. Ct. 1633 (1989), replaced, 878 F.2d 1476
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (affirming and modifying its earlier decision); National Fed'n of Fed.
Employees v. Weinberger, 818 F.2d 935, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1987); McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d
1302, 1307 (8th Cir. 1987); Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1142 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 986 (1986).
One federal judge, in defining urinalysis as a search, stated that "[a] reasonable person
would not expect 'animals, children, snoops, and other members of the public' to rummage
through one's urine, unlike garbage left at the curb." Amalgamated Transit Union Div. 1279
v. Cambria County Transit Auth., 691 F. Supp. 898, 902 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (Diamond, J.).
36. 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd in part and modified in part, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1988).
37. Id. at 175.
38. Id.
39. See supra note 34.
40. 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1390 (1989); accord Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109
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According to the Supreme Court, "[w]hat is reasonable, of course,
'depends on all the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure
and the nature of the search and seizure itself.' "4
The federal courts generally have upheld drug or alcohol testing
when an employer subjects an employee to testing based upon individ-
ualized suspicion that the employee is impaired;42 however, the major-
ity of disputes involve employees who are subjected to drug testing
without individualized suspicion.43 Until recently, the federal courts
were divided as to whether individualized suspicion was required in
order to uphold warrantless drug testing by employers under the
fourth amendment. 44 The Supreme Court has put the issue to rest in
S. Ct. 1402 (1989). With regard to this balancing approach, the Supreme Court has also
stated:
A determination of the standard of reasonableness applicable to a particular class
of searches requires "balancing the nature and quality of the intrusion on the
individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the
governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion." . .. In the case of
searches conducted by a public employer, we must balance the invasion of the
employee's legitimate expectations of privacy against the government's need for
supervision, control and the efficient operation of the workplace.
O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 719 (1987) (citation omitted).
41. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1414 (1989) (quoting United States v. Montoya de Hernandez,
473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985)); accord Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1390 (companion opinion in which
the Court also used an overall balancing approach). In the past, however, the Court has also
used a two-part analysis to balance the respective interests:
[P]ublic employer intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of
government employees for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as
for investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by the standard
of reasonableness under all the circumstances. Under this reasonableness
standard, both the inception and the scope of the intrusion must be reasonable:
"Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a two fold inquiry: first,
one must consider 'whether the ... action was justified at its inception,' Terry v.
Ohio, [392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)]; second, one must determine whether the search as
actually conducted 'was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which
justified the interference in the first place.' " New Jersey v. T.L.O., [469 U.S.
325, 341 (1985)].
O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 725-26.
42. See, e.g., Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264, 1267 (7th
Cir.) (reasonable to test bus drivers involved in a major accident or when reasonably suspected
of drug use), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976); Burka v. New York City Transit Auth., 680 F.
Supp. 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (proper to test transportation workers pursuant to reasonable
suspicion); Wrightsell v. City of Chicago, 678 F. Supp. 727, 734 (N.D. I11. 1988) (proper to test
police officers pursuant to reasonable suspicion); Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482,
484, 491 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (reasonable to test electric line workers who were directly observed
smoking marijuana).
43. See infra notes 54-100 and accompanying text.
44. The Unites States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld testing with less than
individualized suspicion, allowing random testing of transit operators. Transport Workers'
Union, Local 234 v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 863 F.2d 1110 (3d Cir. 1988) (SEPTA),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 109 S. Ct. 3208 (1989). The Fifth Circuit similarly
upheld testing with less than individualized suspicion, and permitted testing of employees who
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two recent companion cases, Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Association 45 and National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,46
holding that individualized suspicion is not a mandatory component
of the fourth amendment reasonableness requirement. In Skinner, the
Court stated that "a showing of individualized suspicion is not a con-
stitutional floor, below which a search must be presumed unreasona-
ble,"'47 thereby holding that individualized suspicion is not mandated
in all cases.48 In both Skinner and Von Raab, the Court further held
that the government may require drug testing of certain employees
without particularized suspicion when the testing is tied to the hap-
pening of a certain event or circumstance that reduces an employee's
reasonable expectation of privacy while furthering strong governmen-
tal interests such as public safety.49
Even prior to the Court's recent rulings, the federal courts have
generally allowed three distinct categories of drug testing absent indi-
vidualized suspicion: (1) testing within certain highly regulated
industries;50 (2) testing pursuant to a regularly scheduled job-related
physical or other specific event;' I and (3) testing justified by concerns
for safety or national security. 52 In the first and third categories, soci-
ety has such an overwhelming concern for protecting the public safety
and the integrity within certain workplaces that the scales weigh in
favor of permitting testing without individualized suspicion. In the
second category, the weight on the side of the employee is lessened by
minimizing the degree of personal intrusion, such as by testing only
during a regularly scheduled job-related physical or upon the happen-
ing of a specific event. It is in the latter category that the Supreme
Court has recently settled the split among the federal courts and
transfer to sensitive positions within the U.S. Customs Service. National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987) (2-1 decision), aff'd in part and modified in
part, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989). The Ninth Circuit, however, struck down an employer drug
testing program in which railroad employees were subjected to post-accident drug testing
absent individualized suspicion; the court held that it was an unreasonable violation of the
fourth amendment. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575 (9th Cir.) (2-1
decision), rev'd sub. nom. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
45. 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
46. 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
47. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1417 (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561
(1976)).
48. Id. ("In limited circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated by the search are
minimal, and where an important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be
placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable
despite the absence of such suspicion.").
49. Id. at 1422; Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1393-95.
50. See infra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 63-80 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 81-92 and accompanying text.
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established that individualized suspicion is not a mandatory require-
ment for testing.5 3
Certain highly regulated industries comprise the first category in
which the federal courts have upheld drug testing without individual-
ized suspicion. This "administrative search" exception to the fourth
amendment is a creature of case law that advocates the government's
ability to search certain premises in a non-criminal context, and it is
typically used when governmental interests would be frustrated by
requiring a warrant in areas where people generally have a lower
expectation of privacy.54 In the seminal case of Shoemaker v. Han-
del,55 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
extended the administrative search exception to permit drug testing of
persons engaged in the highly regulated horseracing industry. 6 The
court upheld regulations by the New Jersey Racing Commission that
subjected jockeys to random drug and alcohol testing.5" The perva-
siveness of governmental regulation and the need to have those in the
horseracing industry untarnished by drug influence suggested to the
court that strong governmental and societal concerns in the integrity
of public wagering outweighed the privacy interests of the participat-
ing individuals.5 " After Shoemaker, the federal courts have applied
the administrative search exception to other highly regulated work-
53. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
54. The federal courts have carved out an exception to the warrant requirement normally
imposed to comport with the reasonableness requirement of the fourth amendment; this
exception applies when the government has a compelling interest to perform certain searches
for administrative purposes. See, e.g., Transport Workers' Union, Local 234 v. Southeastern
Pa. Transp. Auth., 863 F.2d 1110 (3d Cir. 1988) (SEPTA), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 109 S. Ct. 3208 (1989). The administrative search exception permits "warrantless
inspections of commercial property in cases in which the government interest in conducting
the search would be frustrated by requiring prior notice." Id. at 1116. The SEPTA court
further stated that "[c]ases applying the administrative search exception generally involve
statutory schemes aimed at insuring safety or other 'substantial' government interests." Id.
According to the Court in Von Raab, "[w]e have recognized before that requiring the
Government to procure a warrant for every work-related intrusion 'would conflict with the
common-sense realization that government offices could not function if every employment
decision became a constitutional matter.' " National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,
109 S. Ct. 1384, 1391 (1989) (quoting O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 722 (1987) (citation
omitted)).
55. 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986).
56. Id. at 1142.
57. Id. at 1144.
58. Id. at 1142. In Shoemaker, the court used a two-part test in applying the
administrative search exception:' "First, there must be a strong state interest in conducting an
unannounced search. Second, the'pervasive regulation of the industry must have reduced the
justifiable privacy expectation of the search." Id.
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places including nuclear power plants, 9 police departments,6" and
prisons.6' The administrative search exception espoused in Shoe-
maker has become well entrenched as part of federal doctrine; more-
over, it has become an established exception to the individualized
suspicion standard.62
Courts have also allowed drug testing without individualized rea-
sonable suspicion where the testing is tied to a job-related physical or
a specific event. Within this second category of permissible testing,
the Supreme Court has solidified the proposition that drug testing
based upon certain circumstances is constitutional although individu-
59. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the random testing
of employees with access to sensitive areas of a nuclear power plant. Rushton v. Nebraska
Pub. Power Dist., 844 F.2d 562, 567 (8th Cir. 1988), aff'g 653 F. Supp. 1510 (D. Neb. 1987).
The plant had implemented random testing as a response to a newly published policy of the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission that expressed the Commission's concern that a person under
the influence of drugs or alcohol might cause or fail to properly react to an accident, even
though inadvertently. 653 F. Supp. at 1514. In affirming the trial court, the court of appeals
found that the nuclear industry is highly regulated; it thus applied the Shoemaker
administrative search exception. Rushton, 844 F.2d at 566. The court held that the random
drug testing policy at issue was reasonable under the fourth amendment without a showing of
individualized suspicion. Id. at 567.
60. See Policeman's Benevolent Ass'n v. Township of Wash., 850 F.2d 133, 141 (3d Cir.
1988) (Police officers, as members of a highly regulated industry, were subject to the
administrative search exception.); Weicks v. New Orleans Police Dep't, 706 F. Supp. 453
(E.D. La. 1988) (The court, analogizing in part to highly regulated industries, upheld random
testing of police officers working in certain specialized positions, as well as those seeking
transfer into those positions, as reasonable under the fourth amendment.), aff'd mem., 868
F.2d 1269 (5th Cir. 1989); Ford v. Dowd, 697 F. Supp. 1085, 1087 (E.D. Mo. 1988) (Law
enforcement was recognized as a highly regulated occupation.).
In Guiney v. Roache, 873 F.2d 1557, 1558 (1st Cir. 1989), vacating 686 F. Supp. 956 (D.
Mass. 1988), the First Circuit held that random drug testing of police officers who must carry
a firearm was reasonable-analogizing to customs agents who carry firearms. The court of
appeals vacated the district court's ruling that random testing of police officers was
unreasonable and remanded for consideration in light of Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Association, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989), and National Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct.
1384 (1989).
61. See McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302, 1308 (8th Cir. 1987) (The state's interest in
the regulation of prisons is at least as strong as its interest in the horseracing industry.); Poole
v. Stephens, 688 F. Supp. 149, 155 (D.N.J. 1988) (Prison guard recruits were held to be
"similarly situated" to jockeys and those in sensitive areas of nuclear plants.). But see
American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Council 33 v. Meese, 688 F. Supp. 547, 555 (N.D. Cal.
1988) (The court granted a temporary injunction against mass random testing of all employees
of the Federal Bureau of Prisons because the program was unreasonable under the fourth
amendment; it failed the two-part reasonableness test in O'Connor because no evidence of prior
drug abuse was demonstrated.); Taylor v. O'Grady, 669 F. Supp. 1422, 1431, 1438 (N.D. Ill.
1987) (Randomly testing county correction officers was unreasonable because urinalysis does
not prove "on-duty impairment" and because there were less intrusive means (such as trained
supervision) for determining chronic drug use.); see also supra note 41 for the reasonableness
test used in O'Connor.
62. See supra notes 54-61.
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alized suspicion is lacking.63 In these cases, the federal courts have
balanced testing absent individualized suspicion in favor of the
employer. This balance is the result of a lesser intrusion on the
employee's expectation of privacy coupled with a strong governmen-
tal interest. A minimized expectation of privacy may result from a
job-related accident or injury, and testing is necessary to further a
public interest in safety.' 4 In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Association,65 the Supreme Court addressed the issue of post-accident
testing of railroad operating employees involved in a train accident.66
The employer, responding to regulations promulgated by the Federal
Railroad Administration,67 implemented a program of post-accident
drug and alcohol testing for its operating employees. 68  The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the union's chal-
lenge that the testing program violated the employee's fourth amend-
ment right against unreasonable search and seizure.69 In reversing
63. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1417; accord Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1391, 1397. For decisions
applying Skinner and Von Raab, see Jenkins v. Jones, 878 F.2d 1476 (D.C. Cir. 1989);
Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d. 484 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Guiney v. Roache, 873 F.2d 1557 (1st
Cir. 1989); National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Cheney, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 168, at
D-1 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 31, 1989).
64. See, e.g., Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1418-19, 1422 (upheld post-accident drug testing of
railroad operating employees); Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d
1264 (7th Cir.) (reasonable to test bus drivers involved in a serious accident), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1029 (1976); National Air Traffic Controllers Ass'n v. Burnley, 700 F. Supp. 1043 (N.D.
Cal. 1988) (upheld drug testing of air traffic controller when there was reason to believe the
employee contributed to the cause of an accident); Burka v. New York City Transit Auth., 680
F. Supp. 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (reasonable to' administer drug tests to transit operators
following a job-related incident).
65. 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989), rev'g Railroad Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d
575 (9th Cir. 1988).
66. Id.
67. The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) had acted pursuant to the Federal
Railroad Safety Act of 1970, which authorized the Secretary of Transportation to promulgate
the appropriate standards andrules necessary for railroad safety and prescribe regulations that
require drug testing of employees involved in "certain train accidents." Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at
1407. The FRA found that "from 1972 to 1983 'the nation's railroads experienced at least 21
significant train accidents involving alcohol or drugs as a probable cause or contributing
factor,' and that these accidents 'resulted in 25 fatalities, 61 non-fatal injuries, and property
damage estimated at $19 million (approximately $27 million in 1982 dollars).'" Id. at 1407-08
(citations omitted).
68. Id.
69. The union had sought-to enjoin the employer from drug testing absent individualized
suspicion. The district court found, however, that the government's interest in the testing
outweighed the intrusion to the employee. Id. at 1410. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that drug testing of any employee must be based upon
individualized suspicion in order to meet the reasonableness requirement of the fourth
amendment. Id.; see also Railroad Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 592 (9th
Cir. 1988). The Burnley court made an initial determination that the administrative search
exception did not apply because the railroad industry, and not its employees, were the
principal subject of regulation. The court contrasted this with the jockeys in Shoemaker v.
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the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court balanced in favor of the
required drug testing because of a minimized expectation of privacy
by operating employees70 and because of strong public safety
concerns.71
In other cases within the second category of testing, intrusion
into an employee's privacy is lessened, for example, where drug test-
ing accompanies a routine job-related physical by medical personnel 72
Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d. Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1985), who were the principal
subject of regulation. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 585. The court of appeals then applied the
reasonableness test used in O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 719 (1987). Burnley, 839 F.2d
at 586. The court concluded that testing employees for drugs merely because they were
involved in an accident, rather than upon individualized suspicion, was not reasonable at its
"inception." Id. at 587.
70. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1422. The Court found that the "collecting and testing of urine
intrudes upon expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable." Id. at
1413. The Court focused on the primary issue of "whether the Government's need to monitor
compliance with these restrictions justifies the privacy intrusions at issue absent a warrant or
individualized suspicion." Id. at 1415. The Court recognized that the warrant requirement in
this instance would frustrate the governmental purpose in detecting drug or alcohol
consumption. Id. at 1416. The Court stated:
In limited circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated by the search are
minimal, and where an important governmental interest furthered by the
intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized
suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite the absence of such suspicion. We
believe this is true of the intrusion in question here.
Id. at 1417. In this case, the Court found that "the expectations of privacy by covered employ-
ees are diminished by reason of their participation in an industry that is regulated pervasively
to ensure safety, a goal dependent in substantial part, on the health and fitness of covered
employees." Id. at 1418.
71. The Court found "compelling" public interests at stake, stating:
Employees subject to the [drug] tests discharge duties fraught with such risks of
injury to others that even a momentary lapse of attention can have disastrous
consequences. Much like persons who have routine access to dangerous nuclear
power facilities, employees who are subject to testing under the FRA regulations
can cause great human loss before any signs of impairment become noticeable to
supervisors or others.
Id. at 1419 (citations omitted). The Court concluded that the regulations promulgated by the
FRA were reasonable in its aim to protect public safety. Id. at 1421.
In a somewhat similar situation, a transportation company had a policy of requiring any
bus driver involved in a serious accident to submit to a drug test. Division 241 Amalgamated
Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264, 1266 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit balanced the public interest in
safety against the intrusion into the privacy of an operating employee involved in a serious
accident and held that the testing program was reasonable under the fourth amendment. Id. at
1267.
72. See, e.g., Policeman's Benevolent Ass'n v. Township of Wash., 850 F.2d 133 (3d Cir.
1988) (upheld drug testing of police officers during annual job physical); Jones v. McKenzie,
833 F.2d 335, 341 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (upheld drug testing of bus drivers and attendants of
handicapped school children that is "conducted as part of a routine, reasonably required,
employment-related medical examination"), vacated sub nom. Jenkins v. Jones, 109 S. Ct. 1633
(1989), replaced, 878 F.2d 1476 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (affirming and modifying its earlier decision);
Amalgamated Transit Union Div. 1279 v. Cambria County Transit Auth., 691 F. Supp. 898
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or where the testing is conditioned upon an employee voluntarily
transferring to a sensitive position.73 In National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab,74 the Commissioner of Customs implemented a
policy that called for the drug testing of any employee who entered or
transferred into a position meeting certain criteria in three distinct
categories.7" Specifically, any employee that has "direct involvement
in drug interdiction or enforcement of related laws, ' ' 7 6 carries a fire-
arm, or handles certain classified materials is subjected to drug test-
ing.77 The Supreme Court upheld the drug testing of those employees
who enter or transfer to positions encompassed by the first two crite-
ria, but vacated the portion of the case that dealt with the testing of
employees who may have come into contact with "classified" materi-
als. 78 The Court concluded that "the Government's need to conduct
the suspicionless search required by the Customs program outweighs
the privacy interests of employees engaged directly in drug interdic-
tion, and of those who otherwise are required to carry firearms."' 79 In
addition to the testing based on situations like Von Raab, there is a
strong line of federal opinions establishing the proposition that drug
testing by medical personnel during a regularly scheduled job-related
physical for safety purposes is reasonable under the fourth amend-
ment."o In these cases, the employee knows well in advance when the
(W.D. Pa. 1988) (upheld drug testing of bus drivers and mechanics during their annual
physicals); Burka v. New York City Transit Auth., 680 F. Supp. 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (upheld
drug testing of transit operators during their annual physicals); Wrightsell v. City of Chicago,
678 F. Supp. 727, 734 (N.D. Il. 1988) (upheld drug testing of police officers as part of
"routine, employment-related medical examinations").
73. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989), aff'g and
modifying 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1387.
76. Id. at 1388.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1397-98. On the latter issue, the Court remanded for further clarification as to
"whether the category defined by the Service's directive encompasses only those Custom
employees likely to gain access to sensitive information." Id. at 1397. Positions to be tested
under the government's program include those of: accountant, accounting technician, animal
caretaker, attorney (all), baggage clerk, co-op student (all), electric equipment repairer, mail
clerk/assistant, and messenger. Id.
79. Id. at 1392; cf. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989) (In
a companion opinion, the Court upheld the post-accident drug testing of railroad operating
employees absent individualized suspicion.).
80. See supra note 72. In Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1987), for example,
a school system unilaterally implemented a program of testing bus drivers, mechanics, and bus
attendants whose principal duty was transporting handicapped school children. Id. at 336.
The drug testing was made a part of the employees' "routine, reasonably required,
employment-related medical examination." Id. The court applied a fourth amendment
balancing test to determine the reasonableness of the program. Id. at 338. On the individual
rights side of the balance, the court noted that strong privacy interests of the employees were
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test will take place. The drug screening is merely added to other med-
ical tests performed during a routine physical examination.
The cases in this second category of testing create an exception
for drug testing when public confidence and safety concerns are at
stake in connection with either a job-related event or injury-post-
accident testing or voluntary transfers to sensitive positions, for exam-
ple--or as part of a routine job-related physical. The questions
remaining unanswered by the Supreme Court are, however, the con-
stitutionality of purely random drug testing and the constitutionality
of drug testing of employees who do not directly affect public safety
or national security. These questions remain unanswered by the
Court although, in the case of the former question, particular circum-
stances may warrant both a lower expectation of privacy by an
employee and a stronger governmental interest or, in the case of the
latter question, the testing of employees not affecting safety or secur-
ity may be made by less intrusive means than purely random testing.
In the third category of testing, the lower federal courts and at
least one appellate court have upheld random drug testing of employ-
ees holding certain positions due to the exceptional public safety and
national security concerns associated with the positions."1 In Trans-
involved, and that the "privacy interests can be outweighed only by strong governmental
concerns." Id. at 340. The court found, however, that this concern was lessened because
testing as part of the employee's physical examination minimized the intrusion into his
privacy. Id. In looking at the public interest side of the balance, the court noted that the
government has a strong concern for "safely transporting" handicapped students whose
welfare could be jeopardized by transportation employees who are impaired. Id. In balancing
both sides, the court upheld the school system's drug detection program. Id. at 341. The
court further noted that "the test employed is one that has a nexus to the employer's legitimate
safety concern." Id. On certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded in light of
Skinner and Von Raab. Jenkins v. Jones, 109 S. Ct. 1633, 1633 (1989). On remand, the
District of Columbia Circuit reaffirmed its earlier decision with slight modification, stating that
"a drug testing program by the school system 'is not an undue infringement on the justifiable
expectations of privacy of covered employees,' and, therefore, 'the Government's compelling
interests outweigh privacy concerns.' " Jones v. Jenkins, 878 F.2d 1476, 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(citations omitted).
81. See, e.g., National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Cheney, 884 F.2d 603 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(In recognizing public safety and security concerns, the court permitted mandatory random
drug testing by the Army of all personnel who are in aviation, guard/police, or the treatment
staff of the Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Program.), modifying National
Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Carlucci, 690 F. Supp. 46 (D.D.C. 1988); Harmon v. Thornburgh,
878 F.2d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (The court, relying upon Skinner and Von Raab, held that the
random drug testing of all Department of Justice personnel having "top secret" security
clearance was constitutional.); Ensor v. Rust Eng'g Co., 704 F. Supp. 808, 813-16 (E.D. Tenn.
1989) (Ruling upon a fourth amendment claim, the court applied the two-part reasonableness
test used in O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987), and upheld the random drug testing of
construction workers with access to sensitive areas of a government nuclear weapons plant.);
Uniform Div. Officers Ass'n Local 17 v. Brady, No. 88-3377 (D.D.C. Dec. 23, 1988)
(WESTLAW, Allfeds library) (Denying a preliminary injunction to halt random drug testing
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port Workers' Union, Local 234 v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Trans-
portation Authority (SEPTA), 2 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit expanded the permissibility of employee drug test-
ing absent individualized suspicion, if the impairment of an employee
had the potential to cause serious injury to the general public."3 The
court addressed the constitutional validity of a random drug testing
program that was unilaterally imposed on the operating personnel of
a public transportation company operating trains, subways, streetcars,
and buses.84 The court found that the administrative search exception
was not applicable,8 5 and it performed a two-part balancing analysis
to determine the reasonableness of the program. 6 The first inquiry
was whether the program was reasonable at its inception. 7 The court
found that the testing program was justified at its inception because a
number of serious accidents had occurred at the company and a high
percentage of employees had tested positive for drugs."' The second
inquiry was whether the means employed to accomplish the purpose
of secret service agents, the court found "strong," "significant," and "compelling"
governmental interests to justify the program.); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Dole,
670 F. Supp. 445, 446-49 (D.D.C. 1987) (It was reasonable to randomly test "Category I"
Department of Transportation personnel in law enforcement, aviation, and other related
positions.); Mullholland v. Department of the Army, 660 F. Supp. 1565, 1570 (E.D. Va. 1987)
(The random testing of civilians who are responsible for maintaining helicopters that are
critical to our national security was reasonable.).
82. 863 F.2d 1110 (3d Cir. 1988) (SEPTA).
83. Id. at 1113.
84. Id. at 1112. The union challenged the testing program as an unreasonable and
therefore unconstitutional search and seizure under the fourth amendment. Id. The company
had established that of the 262 employees that the company tested "with cause" between the
beginning of 1985 and the middle of 1987, "thirty one percent tested positive for drug
metabolites or alcohol." Id. at 1120. Additionally, the company experienced six major
accidents in 1986-87 after which the operators tested positive for drugs. Id. As a result of
drug abuse among its employees, the company added random drug testing to its existing
substance abuse program. Id.
85. Id. at 1117. The court found that although the transportation industry itself was
highly regulated, the regulation scheme was not aimed at the individual employees; hence, the
employees did not have the decreased expectation of privacy that was a prerequisite of the
administrative search exception. Id.
86. The court stated the two part balancing test:
When justification for a warrantless search conducted without probable cause is
sought on the basis of the balancing of the government interest and the
individual's privacy expectations, we must apply a two-part test. Courts must
look, first, to whether the search as actually conducted was "justified at its
inception," and second, to whether the search "was reasonably related in scope
to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place."
Id. at 1118.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1121. In 1986 and 1987, six operators tested positive for drugs after being
involved in accidents. Id. at 1119-20. Furthermore, of the "new hires" given drug tests during
that same period, 12% tested positive for drugs. Id. at 1120.
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of the program were reasonable.8 9 The court found that the need to
test was related to the program's purpose, which was to uncover drug
users in positions affecting public safety and not to detect impair-
ment.90 Moreover, the court found that the program was reasonably
designed to meet those ends.9' The court held in favor of the
employer and entered a new order that allowed random testing if cer-
tain conditions were met.92 Although SEPTA and a handful of dis-
trict court opinions carve out an exception where there is a great
concern for public safety, it is still premature to predict if this excep-
tion will be constitutionally affirmed upon further review. Although
the Supreme Court has not yet addressed purely random drug testing,
exceptionally strong public safety and national security interests
weigh in its favor under the balancing approach adopted by the Skin-
ner and Von Raab Court.
In cases which do not have dominant elements from any of the
89. Id. at 1118.
90. Id. at 1122.
91. The court noted that management discretion was minimized through computerized
random selection of those who were to be tested. Moreover, the program had specific
safeguards that protected employees by regulating the chain of custody, verification, and
confidentiality. Id. at 1121-22.
92. The testing program was "limited to employees whose job performance implicates
public safety." Id. at 1121. The court held the rule requiring employees who were absent
more than 30 days from work to be subjected to drug testing as unconstitutional because these
employees were also subjected to the random testing program. Id. at 1122.
The Third Circuit, however, exempted railway employees from random testing, holding
that they were entitled to the status quo pursuant to Sections 5 and 6 of the Railway Labor
Act, Ch. 247, §§ 5-6, 44 Stat 577 (1926) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 155, 156 (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986). SEPTA, 863 F.2d at 1122-24 (relying on Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v.
Conrail, 845 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1988), which held that drug testing is a "major dispute").
Subsequent to this decision, the Supreme Court reversed Conrail and held that management
imposed drug testing of railroad employees during their physical examinations was a "minor,"
not "major," dispute under the Railway Labor Act. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway
Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 2477, 2479-80 (1989); see supra note 24.
On June 26, 1989, the Supreme Court granted petitioners' writ of certiorari from the
Third Circuit's decision in SEPTA. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth. v. Transport Workers'
Union, Local 234, 109 S. Ct. 3208 (1989). The Court vacated the Third Circuit's opinion and
remanded "for further consideration in light of Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor
Executives Ass'n." Id. Because Consolidated Rail applies only to those SEPTA employees
covered under the Railway Labor Act, it is unlikely that the remainder of the Third Circuit's
original opinion pertaining to the constitutionality of the random testing program will be
affected. Had the Supreme Court disagreed with the reasoning of the court of appeals on the
fourth amendment issue, the Court probably would have also cited its recent opinions, Skinner
v. Railway Labor Executives' Association, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989), and National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989), both involving employee drug testing.
Furthermore, because the Supreme Court in Consolidated Rail classified drug testing as a
"minor dispute," on remand, the Third Circuit will have the latitude to lift the injunction
excluding railway employees from management ordered drug testing-something it could not
do if the issue was a "major dispute." Consolidated Rail, 109 S. Ct. at 2480-81.
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previous categories, the federal courts generally have struck down
drug testing programs that are not founded upon individualized suspi-
cion and that are void of strong governmental interests. 93 In Bangert
v. Hodel,94 for example, the Department of Interior unilaterally imple-
mented an employee drug testing program with a random testing
component in addition to a reasonable suspicion component.9" The
union contested the program as an unreasonable search and seizure
under the fourth amendment. 96 The court found that the program
was not designed to promote the government's objective of eliminat-
ing or reducing drug impairment in the workplace because the gov-
ernment failed to demonstrate any significant amount of previous
drug abuse within the designated positions. 97  Moreover, the court
found that the program was overly broad in selecting those employees
to be subjected to random testing, explaining that it is hardly credible
that there were thousands of employees occupying sensitive posi-
tions.98 Many of the employees targeted for random testing did not
occupy positions that directly affected either national security or pub-
lic safety. 99 The district court gave great deference to the concept of
93. See, e.g., Owner-Operators Indep. Drivers Ass'n v. Burnley, 705 F. Supp. 481 (N.D.
Cal. 1989) (The court granted a temporary injunction on mass random testing and post-
accident testing of commercial vehicle drivers because the tests were unreasonable under the
fourth amendment.); Harmon v. Meese, 690 F. Supp. 65, 69-70 (D.D.C. 1988) (The court
granted a temporary injunction preventing mass random testing in the "Offices, Boards and
Litigating Divisions of the Department of Justice" because the employer could show no
history of employee drug abuse nor show a "nexus between what the search is expected to
produce and the governmental interest."), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub noma. Harmon v.
Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (The court upheld an injunction prohibiting drug
testing of all federal prosecutors and all employees who have access to grand jury
proceedings.); Thomson v. Weinberger, 682 F. Supp. 829 (D. Md. 1988) (The testing of
civilian employees of the Army without individualized suspicion was unreasonable under the
fourth amendment.), rev'd sub nom. Thomson v. Marsh, 878 F.2d 1431 (4th Cir. 1989); Capua
v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986) (The mass testing of all firefighters and
policemen without individualized suspicion was unreasonable under the fourth amendment.);
Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (The mass testing of all
firefighters without individualized suspicion was unreasonable under the fourth amendment.).
94. 705 F. Supp. 643 (D.D.C. 1989).
95. Id. at 645.
96. Id. at 645, 647.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 649.
99. Id. The sensitive positions included clerical assistants, mail and file clerks, secretaries,
personnel officers, auditors, and "some 3,753 Bureau of Indian Affairs teachers, education
specialists, counselors, dormitory attendants and social workers." Id. The court estimated
that only about one out of every 2000 employees would be uncovered as a drug user under the
government's drug testing program. Id. at 652. The court stated: "Yet, the government has
singled out its loyal, almost completely drug-free public servants for a vast, intrusive testing
program as the only one where the drug menace must be fought without the normal
constitutional protection of individualized cause." Id. at 654.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
individual privacy from unwarranted searches and, in a sternly
worded opinion, granted the union a temporary injunction against the
random testing portion of the program. '00 In contrast to the second
category of cases previously mentioned, none of the cases in this
group involved testing as part of a job-related physical nor were they
limited only to post-accident situations. Within this group, no
increased weight is given to the state interest nor is there a lessening
of an employee's reasonable expectation of privacy. In applying the
outright balancing approach used by the Supreme Court in Skinner
and in Von Raab, it is unlikely that the testing of employees in posi-
tions that have no bearing on public safety, national security, or other
overriding state interests will be constitutionally valid absent individ-
ualized reasonable suspicion.
The current body of federal case law seems to be slowly shifting
the scales in favor of the broader societal concern of eradicating drugs
from the workplace by expanding the areas in which drug testing is
constitutionally permissible absent individualized suspicion. Trans-
port Workers' Union, Local 234 v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Trans-
portation Authority (SEPTA)"10 represents the outer limit of these
cases. The SEPTA court went beyond the exception for highly regu-
lated industries that was articulated in Shoemaker v. Handel 102 and
Rushton v. Nebraska Public Power District,03 and beyond the excep-
tion for drug testing in which personal intrusion is minimized by cir-
cumstances such as the annual job-related physicals illustrated in
Jones v. McKenzie. " The SEPTA opinion draws its strength from
the assertion that, in public transportation, safety concerns for the
daily travelling public outweigh the personal intrusions of random
100. Id. at 654-56. Judge Green posed a hypothetical scene that might occur if the testing
was upheld:
[Als the tourists view the majestic Interior Department buildings from the
outside, there being lectured by their tour guides on the freedoms under our
system of government, on the inside of these buildings platoons of bureaucrats
will march in unending streams toward the Department's toilets for their next
urination procedure under the steady gaze of the government's urination
inspectors. As the toilets are reached, these inspectors will make certain that the
candidates' outer garments are removed and nothing untoward has been hidden,
that the water in the bowl is sufficiently blue, the urine is at the correct
temperature of between 90.5 and 99.8 degrees Fahrenheit, and the cup is
sufficiently full.
Id. at 655.
101. 863 F.2d 1110 (3d Cir. 1988) (SEPTA), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 109 S.
Ct. 3208 (1989).
102. 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986).
103. 844 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1988).
104. 833 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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drug testing."' 5 The Supreme Court has reinforced this shift in the
law of drug testing through their recent opinions in Skinner' 06 and
Von Raab.'1 7 A discernable trend is emerging in which the federal
courts are increasingly diluting individual rights of privacy when drug
testing is at issue.
B. Substantive and Procedural Due Process Under the Fourteenth
Amendment
Employees have also challenged drug testing programs as viola-
tive of their constitutional right of due process.10 8 Pursuant to the
fifth and fourteenth amendments, the government may not act to
deprive any person "of life, liberty or property without due process of
law."' 0 9 The fifth amendment restricts the federal government from
violating an individual's right of due process, and the fourteenth
amendment similarly bars state governments-and their political sub-
divisions-from depriving any person of due process of law."10 Due
process has both a procedural and a substantive component."II Pro-
cedural due process provides that the government must use a fair pro-
cedure before depriving a person of "life, liberty or property.""11 2
Substantive due process analysis, on the other hand, focuses on the
constitutionality of the "substance" or effect of a governmental action
or law and not on the actual process used."I3
Under procedural due process analysis, a two-step approach is
used to ascertain if an individual's rights have been violated.' First,
the employee must have a constitutionally protected property or lib-
erty interest at stake."I5 Second, the court must determine what pro-
cess the individual is due before that property or liberty interest may
105. 863 F.2d 1110, 1124 (3d Cir. 1988). The court held: "[T]here are some public
interests that carry sufficient weight to justify even a more than minimal privacy intrusion.
Public health and safety concerns have traditionally been considered of the highest magnitude
of public interest considerations." Id.
106. 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
107. 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
108. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
109. The fifth amendment states: "No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law .... ." U.S. CONST. amend V. The fourteenth
amendment states: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
110. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 314-16 (3d ed.
1986).
111. Id. at 321-22.
112. Id. at 322.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 452-53.
115. Id.
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be taken away. 1 6 In the context of drug testing of public sector
employees, the first question is whether the employee has a liberty or
property interest in his job or reputation.
The concept of liberty within the fourteenth amendment includes
"those provisions of the Bill of Rights which the Court deems to be
'incorporated' into the due process clause as well as 'fundamental'
rights which are derived either from the concept of liberty or other
constitutional values."' 7 According to one constitutional law text:
When the government acts as an employer there are special issues
regarding the existence of liberty and property rights in employ-
ment. If the individual employee has not been granted a term of
guaranteed employment, absent removal for just cause, he will
have no property right or entitlement to continue employment in
that position....
However, if dismissing the employee, the government also
forecloses the individual's possible employment in a wide range of
activities in both the public and private sectors, this dismissal will
constitute a deprivation of liberty sufficient to require that the indi-
vidual be granted a fair hearing.' 18
Also, if a government official impugns a person's reputation so as to
limit his "freedom of choice or action," such as by distributing false
information about the person, this may constitute a violation of a per-
son's liberty under due process. "19 The harm to the person's reputa-
tion must be so severe, however, that it restricts the person's ability to
gain employment or to associate with others. 120
The scope of property under due process centers on the concept
of "entitlement."'' An individual has an entitlement in public sector
employment if the individual has been hired for a position and is guar-
anteed continued employment by applicable law.' An employee
possessing an entitlement must receive fair process before the public
sector employer may withdraw a benefit.' 23 Additionally, an
116. Id.
117. Id. at 459. According to the authors of one constitutional law treatise: "The most
significant implied 'fundamental rights' are the right to freedom of association, the right to
interstate travel, the right to privacy (including some freedom of choice in marital, family, and
sexual matters), and the right to vote." Id. at 465. Procedural due process requires that the
government not limit a person from exercising a "fundamental constitutional right" without a
procedure to determine the basis for the limitation. Id. at 465-66.
118. Id. at 469.
119. Id. at 470-71.
120. Id. at 471.
121. Id. at 474.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 475. Entitlement theory applies to government employees. Id. at 478-79. The
authors stated: "If the government gives the employee assurances of continual employment or
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employee can be deprived of a property interest in his reputation if
governmental action so injures the employee's reputation as to
deprive him of the liberty to seek other associations or "employment
opportunities."12 '
The second question within procedural due process is: What
process is the employee due?125 The guarantee of due process is that
it "must be fundamentally fair to the individual in the resolution of
the factual and legal basis for governmental actions which deprive
him of life, liberty, or property."' 126 In Mathews v. Eldridge,'2" the
Supreme Court established a balancing test to determine what proce-
dures are due an individual. 28
In the drug testing context, one federal judge has stated that
"[tihe essential elements of [procedural] due process are notice and a
fair opportunity to be heard."1 29 In Capua v. City of Plainfield, 30 the
city subjected all firefighters to a surprise drug test via urinalysis.13'
The firefighters who had tested positive for drugs were immediately
fired. 1 32 The Capua court found that the firefighters had "constitu-
tionally protected property interests" in their jobs under state stat-
dismissal for only specified reasons, then there must be a fair procedure to protect the
employee's interests when the government seeks to discharge him from the position." Id. at
479. The entitlement may be created as a matter of statute, contract, or supervisory action.
Id.
124. Id. at 480.
125. Id. at 485.
126. Id. at 487.
127. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
128. The Mathews Court formulated a three prong balancing test, stating:
[O]ur prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates of due
process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the
private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requisites
would entail.
Id. at 335.
129. Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 494. (N.D. Ga. 1985) (There was no
violation of procedural due process for employees who were fired for smoking marijuana on
the job-the procedures for "appeal of termination are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of
notice and fair opportunity to be heard."); see also Poole v. Stephens, 688 F. Supp. 149, 158
(D.N.J. 1988) ("Post-determination hearing" satisfied due process requirements for correction
officer recruits who tested positive for drugs.); Burka v. New York City Transit Auth., 680 F.
Supp. 590, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (Applicants for employment do not have a protected property
right, and employed plaintiffs are given fair hearings within the meaning of due process.).
130. 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986).
131. Id. at 1511.
132. Id. at 1512.
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ute. 13 3  The court held that the city's unilateral action was
"completely lacking in procedural safeguards."'' 34 Procedural due
process in the drug testing context also requires that test results that
lead to the disciplining of an employee must be based upon accurate
procedures. 35 The court must weigh the "risk of an erroneous depri-
vation of [a property or liberty] interest through the procedures used"
against the government's interests in light of possible alternatives. 36
In this context, the chance of the drug testing program yielding inac-
curate results due to laboratory procedures or misidentified samples
must be considered in deciding whether the employee's procedural
due process rights have been violated.
Under substantive due process analysis, the courts look to see if
the challenged activity is tailored to fit the government's objective. ,3'
In the context of drug testing, the objective is a safer workplace that is
free of drugs. One constitutional text stated: "[W]hile due process
still protects a person's liberty in society, only those liberties or rights
of 'fundamental' constitutional magnitude will be actively protected
by the Supreme Court. . . .Only when a law is a totally arbitrary
deprivation of liberty will it violate the substantive due process guar-
antee."13 Hence, a drug testing program would only violate the sub-
stantive due process rights of an employee if the drug testing program
were so arbitrary or unreliable as to deprive the employee of a funda-
133. Id. at 1520. The court stated that the firefighters, as municipal employees, had "a
reasonable expectation of continued employment unless and until 'just cause' is established for
their termination [under state statute]." Id. The court added that the state's "statutory
scheme bestows a property interest upon plaintiffs which cannot be abrogated by their
government employer without due process." Id. (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill,
470 U.S. 532 (1985)).
134. Id. The court stated:
Such testing was unilaterally imposed by [the city] as a condition of employment
without prior notice to plaintiffs and without opportunity for plaintiffs to voice
objection or seek advice of counsel. There were no standards promulgated to
govern such department-wide drug raids, nor any provisions made to protect the
confidentiality interests of firefighters whose personal physiological information
unexpectedly came into the hands of government authorities.
Id. at 1521.
135. See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 181 (5th
Cir. 1987) (The procedures utilized in testing, storing, and handling the urinalysis sample did
not violate the plaintiff's right to due process.), aff'd and modified on other grounds, 109 S. Ct.
1384 (1989); Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 653 F. Supp. 1510, 1525-27 (D. Neb.
1987) (The court held that the procedures were reliable because the union had failed to show
any harm caused or likely to be caused by the possibility of a third party tampering with or
confusing the urinalysis sample.), aff'd, 844 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1988).
136. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
137. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 110, at 357.
138. Id.
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mental right such as privacy."' In Rushton v. Nebraska Public Power
District,"4 for example, the union challenging a mandatory drug test-
ing program advanced the claim that the procedures used were so
unreliable as to violate substantive due process.' 4 ' The Rushton court
looked at the procedures used and ascertained that there was not a
major risk of "false positives" that could act as an arbitrary or capri-
cious deprivation of liberty.' 42 The court concluded that the drug
testing program did not violate the employee's rights to due
process. 113
In sum, a public sector employer may not discipline or discharge
an employee under a substance abuse program unless the employee
was accorded fair notice and the opportunity to be heard. Addition-
ally, the employer is constrained from acting in an arbitrary or capri-
cious manner when sanctioning the employee; otherwise, fundamental
rights of fairness are violated.
III. PRIVATE SECTOR: DRUG TESTING AND ARBITRATORS
The Constitution restricts the government from infringing upon
certain individual rights and liberties.1'4 Absent state action, how-
ever, private sector employers are not constrained by the Constitu-
tion. 14  Non-union employees subjected to management imposed
drug testing must therefore seek relief through state statutes, where
139. Id.
140. 653 F. Supp. 1510 (D. Neb. 1987), aff'd, 844 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1988).
141. Id. at 1525.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. The majority of "individual rights and liberties" provided for by the Constitution and
its amendments are restrictions only on government action. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, supra note 110, at 421. Generally, private persons, such as private sector employers,
are not constrained by the Constitution. "State action" arises any time a government entity is
involved, either federal or state, including the actions of any legislative, executive, or judicial
body. In some instances, however, a private entity's actions are so connected to a
governmental entity as to subject the private entity to constitutional limitations. Id. at 422.
The courts look to see if the government has "commanded, encouraged or otherwise directed"
the private actor in performing a "state" function; if it has, the private action falls within the
purview of the Constitution. Id. at 432.
The cases where the relationship between the governmental entity and the private actor
may bring the Constitution into play generally fall into one of three categories: (1) the private
actor is extensively regulated or licensed by the government; (2) there are numerous "physical
and economic contacts" between the government and the private actor; or (3) the private actor
was provided some form of direct aid or subsidy by the government. Id. at 438. In essence,
the courts generally balance the various factors in deciding if the private actor is constrained
by the Constitution under the doctrine of "state action." For a complete discussion of state
action, see generally id. at 421-50; Schneider, State Action-Making Sense Out of Chaos-An
Historical Approach, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 737 (1985).
145. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 110, at 421-50; see, e.g., Skinner
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they exist, and through common law tort actions. 146  In addition to
having rights afforded non-union workers, union employees in the pri-
vate sector have rights under subsections 8(a)(5) and 8(d) of the
NLRA with which they may challenge management imposed drug
testing programs.'4 7 Unions may further claim that management uni-
laterally breached a collective bargaining agreement by exceeding the
scope of management's enumerated rights.1 4  A union may proceed
simultaneously against management under both the NLRA and the
collective bargaining agreement. 149
The initial question in determining whether management may
unilaterally impose a drug testing program is whether management
must first bargain with the union before establishing such a program.
The obligation to bargain with a union prior to implementing a drug
testing policy can arise as a matter of statute,15 ° as a matter of con-
v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989). The Skinner Court applied
constitutional law to a private railroad under "state action" doctrine, stating:
A railroad that complies with the provisions of Subpart C of the [FRA
regulations] does so by compulsion of sovereign authority, and the lawfulness of
its acts is controlled'by the Fourth Amendment. . . . [Petitioner argues that
nothing in the regulations] compels any testing by private railroads ....
Whether a private party should be deemed an agent or instrument of the
Government for Fourth Amendment purposes necessarily turns on the degree of
the Government's participation in the private party's activities, . . . a question
that can only be resolved "in light of all of the circumstances." . . . Here, specific
features of the regulations combine to convince us that the Government did more
than adopt a passive position toward the underlying private conduct.
Id. at 1411 (citations omitted).
146. For a complete discussion of state statutory actions and common law tort actions
against management for unilaterally imposed drug testing on employees, see Survey, Survey of
the Law on Employee Drug Testing, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 553, 650-80 (1988).
147. The National Labor Relations Act was established to promote both industrial peace
and commerce. See R. GORMAN, supra note 9, at 1. An employer can violate Section (8)(a)(5)
of the Act by failing to bargain with the union over implementation of a substance abuse
program, it can violate Section (8)(d) by unilaterally changing the terms and conditions of the
collective bargaining agreement, or it can violate both sections. See id. at 455-66; see also
Lynch, Deferral, Waiver, and Arbitration Under the NLRA: From Status to Contract and Back
Again, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 237, 259-64 (1989).
148. The collective bargaining agreement by its terms may require a duty to bargain. See,
e.g., infra note 149. In addition to the parties' possible obligations to bargain, arbitrators will
interpret the management rights provisions of collective bargaining agreements under basic
notions of contract interpretation when deciding where to place the entitlement to drug test.
149. See, e.g., Laidlaw Transit, 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1001 (1987) (Caraway, Arb.) (The
union filed both an unfair labor practice with the NLRB pursuant to the NLRA and an
arbitration grievance under the collective bargaining agreement.).
150. NLRA § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5); see supra note 12. See generally Casey, Drug
Testing in a Unionized Environment, 13 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 599 (1988) (discussing the duty
to bargain under the NLRA); Morikawa, Hurtgen, Connor, & Costello, Implementation of
Drug and Alcohol Testing in the Unionized Workplace, 11 NOVA L.J. 653 (1987) (discussing
the duty to bargain with the union under the NLRA); Survey, Survey of the Law on Employee
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tract, I5' or possibly both. 52 When a labor dispute involves both stat-
utory issues pursuant to the NLRA and contractual issues pursuant
to a collective bargaining agreement, both the NLRB and the arbitra-
tor have jurisdiction.'53 Arbitrators will additionally inquire whether
management's program is reasonable as a matter of contract interpre-
tation. 14 The first part of this Section will focus upon management's
duty to bargain in the unionized private sector. The second part of
Drug Testing, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 553, 609-34 (1988) (discussing the rights and duties of
collective bargaining under the NLRA).
151. A contractual duty to bargain may be created in at least three different ways. First, a
clause in a collective bargaining agreement may incorporate a duty to bargain into the
collective agreement by reference. Second, the arbitrator may infer the requirements of the
NLRA into the contract. Generally, however, arbitrators see themselves as interpreters of
collective bargaining agreements rather than enforcers of affirmative statutory duties to
bargain under the NLRA; they thus avoid resolving statutory conflicts in this area. See F.
ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 336 (3d ed. 1977). Third, the terms
and conditions of an agreement may place a duty upon management to give the union notice
and bargain over any changes in the rules, such as a safety requirement, before they are
implemented. See, e.g., Gem City Chems., Inc., 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1023 (1986) (Warns,
Arb.) (Management may not unilaterally implement drug testing as a safety matter when the
labor agreement required bargaining over all safety matters.).
152. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 151, at 334 (discussing the NLRA, the
arbitrator, and the NLRB).
153. Id.; see also Comment, Distinguishing Arbitration and Private Settlement in NLRB
Deferral Policy, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 341 (1989).
154. Arbitrators have often focused on the reasonableness of particular drug testing
programs. See Boston Edison Co., 92 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 374 (1989) (Nicolau, Arb.); Dow
Chem. Co., 91 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1385 (1989) (Baroni, Arb.); Southern Cal. Rapid Transit
Dist., 89-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8117 (1989) (Jones, Arb.); Regional Transp. Dist., 91
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 213 (1988) (Goldstein, Arb.); Department of the Army, 91 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
137 (1988) (Huffcut, Arb.); Vulcan Materials Co., 90 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1161 (1988) (Caraway,
Arb.); Utility Workers Union, Local No. 387, 89-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8406 (1988)
(Fraser, Arb.); Warehouse Distrib. Centers, Inc., 90 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 979 (1987) (Weiss,
Arb.); Sanford Corp., 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 968 (1987) (Wies, Arb.); North County Transit
Dist., 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 768 (1987) (Collins, Arb.); Trailways, Inc., 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
1073 (1987) (Goodman, Arb.); Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1001 (1987)
(Heinsz, Arb.); Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., 88-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8204 (1987)
(Kindig, Arb.); International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 647, 87-2 Lab. Arb.
Awards (CCH) 8570 (1987) (Weisbrod, Arb.); Marathon Petroleum Co., 87-2 Lab. Arb.
Awards (CCH) 8549 (1987) (Grimes, Arb.); Metropolitan Transit Auth., 87-2 Lab. Arb.
Awards (CCH) 8472 (1987) (Baroni, Arb.); Albuquerque Mailers Union Local No. 156, 87-2
Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8427 (1987) (Fogleberg, Arb.); Union Plaza Hotel, 88 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 528 (1986) (McKay, Arb.); Citgo Petroleum Corp., 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 521 (1986)
(Allen, Arb.); Hopeman Bros., 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 373 (1986) (Rothschild, Arb.); Concrete
Pipe Prods. Co., 87 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 601 (1986) (Caraway, Arb.); Gem City Chems., Inc., 86
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1023 (1986) (Warns, Arb.); Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 86-2 Lab. Arb.
Awards (CCH) 8507 (1986) (Volz, Arb.); Weyerhauser Co., 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 182 (1985)
(Levin, Arb.); CFS Continental, Inc., 86-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8070 (1985) (Lumbley,
Arb.); Gulf Oil Prods. Co., 85-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8481 (1985) (Holman, Arb.).
One arbitrator, in deciding whether a unilaterally imposed drug testing program violated
the parties' collective bargaining agreement, stated: "[The reasonableness test] stems, not just
from general principles of industrial relations and the balancing of interests inherent therein,
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this Section will consider what values arbitrators have assigned in
interpreting a collective bargaining agreement absent a duty to
bargain.
A. Duty to Bargain
If management is under a duty to bargain with a union but it
implements a drug testing program before doing so, then management
may be charged in court with an unfair labor practice under the
NLRA and risk having the drug testing program enjoined. 55 Simi-
larly, an arbitrator may void the program pursuant to the collective
bargaining agreement because of management's failure to bargain
with the union prior to the program's implementation. 5 6 Moreover,
the NLRB General Counsel's Advice Memorandum157 has mandated
that the implementation of any drug testing policy be a subject of
bargaining between the employer and the unions.' The majority of
published arbitrators' opinions,159 however, make no mention of the
employer's duty to bargain with the union, as the opinion by the
NLRB General Counsel's Advice Memorandum would require, prior
to the implementation of testing.16"
but from the specific provisions of the Parties' collective agreement." Boston Edison, 92 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) at 380.
155. See supra note 147. The NLRB may seek to enjoin management's unilateral program
pursuant to Section 10(j) of the NLRA until the parties bargain to agreement or to a good faith
impasse. See NLRA § 100), 29 U.S.C. § 1600). It is unclear, however, what remedy would be
available to an employee who is disciplined after testing positive under a program initiated in
the absence of such bargaining.
156. See, e.g., Philips Indus., Inc., 90 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 222 (1988) (DiLeone, Arb.) (The
employer's drug testing program was void for failure to bargain with the union.); Laidlaw
Transit, 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1001 (1987) (Caraway, Arb.) (same).
157. See supra note 9.
158. Id; see also infra note 162. The NLRB has affirmed the position of the General
Counsel that drug testing is a mandatory subject of bargaining. Johnson Bateman Co., Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 117, at F-1 (June 20, 1989). But see Star Tribune, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 117, at E-1 (June 20, 1989) (a companion opinion in which the NLRB held that
the drug testing of applicants is not a mandatory subject of bargaining because job applicants
are not part of the bargaining unit).
159. This research includes labor arbitration cases that involve mandatory employee drug
testing, as published in Labor Arbitration Awards (CCH) and Labor Arbitration Reports
(BNA) principally between 1985 and 1989.
160. See Regional Transp. Dist., 91 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 213 (1988) (Goldstein, Arb.);
Department of the Army, 91 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 137 (1988) (Huffcut, Arb.); Vulcan Materials
Co., 90 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1161 (1988) (Caraway, Arb.); Maple Meadow Mining, 90 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 873 (1988) (Phelan, Arb.); Boise Cascade Corp., 90 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 791 (1988)
(Nicholas, Arb.); International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local Union No. 351, 88-2 Lab.
Arb. Awards (CCH) 8318 (1988) (Williams, Arb.); Warehouse Distrib. Centers, Inc., 90
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 979 (1987) (Weiss, Arb.); Sanford Corp., 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 968 (1987)
(Wies, Arb.); South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 845 (1987) (Boals, Arb.);
North County Transit Dist., 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 768 (1987) (Collins, Arb.); Trailways, Inc.,
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In spite of this situation, at least one arbitrator has expressly fol-
lowed the mandate of the General Counsel's Advice Memorandum.
In Laidlaw Transit, 161 the arbitrator held that the employer was under
a duty to bargain over a drug testing program as required by the Gen-
eral Counsel.1 62  The union had filed both a class action grievance
pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement and an unfair labor
practice charge with the NLRB under Subsections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5)
of the NLRA; 163 these claims were based on management's refusal to
bargain over the implementation of the policy. 164 The NLRB
deferred the violations of the NLRA to the arbitrator. 165 The arbitra-
tor found that the union had "never explicitly or implicitly surren-
dered its Section 8(a)(5) rights to negotiate the change of conditions of
employment inherent [in] implementing a drug testing program." 166
88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1073 (1987) (Goodman, Arb.); Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 88 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 1001 (1987) (Heinsz, Arb.); Young Insulation Group, Inc. 88-1 Lab. Arb. Awards
(CCH) 8205 (1987) (Boals, Arb.); ITT Barton Instruments Co., 88-1 Lab. Arb. Awards
(CCH) 8013 (1987) (Draznin, Arb.); Texas City Ref., Inc., 87-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH)
8609 (1987) (Milentz, Arb.); Marathon Petroleum Co., 87-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8549
(1987) (Grimes, Arb.); Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1433, 87-2 Lab. Arb. Awards
(CCH) 8510 (1987) (Speroff, Arb.); Metropolitan Transit Auth., 87-2 Lab. Arb. Awards
(CCH) 8472 (1987) (Baroni, Arb.); Union Plaza Hotel, 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 528 (1986)
(McKay, Arb.); Citgo Petroleum Corp., 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 521 (1986) (Allen, Arb.);
Hopeman Bros., 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 373 (1986) (Rothschild, Arb.); Union Oil Co., 88 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 91 (1986) (Weiss, Arb.); Deaconess Medical Center, 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 44
(1986) (Robinson, Arb.); Concrete Pipe Prods. Co., 87 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 601 (1986) (Caraway,
Arb.); Gem City Chems., Inc., 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1023 (1986) (Warns, Arb.); Indianapolis
Power & Light Co., 86-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8507 (1986) (Volz, Arb.); Weyerhauser
Co., 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 182 (1985) (Levin, Arb.); Inspiration Consol. Copper Co., 85-2 Lab.
Arb. Awards (CCH) 8534 (1985) (Tamoush, Arb.); Gulf Oil Prods. Co., 85-2 Lab. Arb.
Awards (CCH) T 8481 (1985) (Holman, Arb.).
161. 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1001 (1987) (Allen, Arb.).
162. Id. at 1018. The arbitrator concluded:
[A] drug testing policy goes beyond the scope of a mere "work rule;" rather it is a
dramatic and significant change in terms and conditions of employment,
involving particularly safety and disciplinary actions, which should be negotiated
in accordance with Sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d) of the National Labor Relations
Act.
Probably the most significant form of support for the undersigned's
determination herein comes from a very recent ruling by NLRB General Counsel
Rosemary Collyer.
1d; see supra note 9.
163. NLRA § 8(a)(l), (5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (5); see supra note 12.
164. Laidlaw Transit, 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 1005. The union asserted that "unilateral
changes by an employer during the course of a collective bargaining relationship concerning
matters which are mandatory subjects of bargaining are generally regarded as per se refusals to
bargain." Id. at 1010.
165. Id. at 1005.
166. Id. at 1020. The arbitrator further found that although the management rights clause
of the collective bargaining agreement gave the company the right to adopt "reasonable work
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The arbitrator held that the parties are to negotiate to an agreement
or to a "good faith impasse," in which case testing can be resumed. 1 67
Implicit in the arbitrator's opinion is the conclusion that if manage-
ment implements its drug testing policy after reaching impasse, the
union's only recourse is to re-arbitrate the issue; however, the effect of
this would be to preclude the union from "striking."
In contrast to Laidlaw Transit, the arbitrator in Donaldson Min-
ing Co. 168 based his ruling on the interpretation of the collective bar-
gaining agreement and not on the NLRA.' 69  The Donaldson
arbitrator specifically stated: "While the Union has taken the position
that the Company's actions constitute a violation of the National
Labor Relations Act, the findings in this matter flow from an applica-
tion of the terms and conditions of the agreement."' 70 The arbitrator
held, however, that the employer must cease its drug testing program
because it had acted unreasonably in not giving the employees prior
notice of the program's implementation. 171
Aside from a possible statutory duty to bargain under the
rules," there was nothing in the agreement that mentioned drug testing. Id. Because "the
labor agreement [did] not specifically grant to management the right to unilaterally establish
and enforce a drug testing policy, then it should be considered a 'condition of employment'
requiring joint negotiations." Id.
167. Id. at 1022.
168. 91 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 471 (1988) (Zobrak, Arb.).
169. Id. at 475. The union had filed an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB over
the company's refusal to bargain over the implementation of drug testing. Id. at 473. The
NLRB Regional Director chose not to issue a complaint on the matter and instead
"administratively deferred" the matter to the arbitrator. Id.
170. Id. at 475. The arbitrator recognized the position stated by the NLRB General
Counsel:
In Memorandum GC-87-5 issued September, 1987, the General Counsel took the
position that drug testing for current employees and job applicants is a
mandatory subject for bargaining under Section 8(d) of the NLRA. The General
Counsel also took the position that implementation of a drug testing program is a
substantial change in working conditions, even where physical examinations
previously have been given.
Id. The arbitrator then stated, however, that the opinion of the General Counsel was subject
to approval and that he was basing his findings on the agreement. Id.
171. Id. at 476; see also Albuquerque Mailers Union Local No. 156, 87-2 Lab. Arb. Awards
(CCH) 8427, at 5629 (1987) (Fogleberg, Arb.). The arbitrator stated that:
[T]he Grievant and his [union] representative allege that the Employer, by
unilaterally putting its Start from Scratch [drug testing] program into effect,
violated the National Labor Relations Act by refusing to bargain over these
subjects, and therefore the program itself is not valid. This position however,
must be rejected in the light of the specific language set forth in the parties'
Master Agreement . . . which . . . reserves with the Company the right to
establish, amend and enforce reasonable rules and regulations provided they do
not conflict with the express provisions of the Contract or applicable law.
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NLRA, a collective bargaining agreement may provide that the par-
ties are to negotiate any changes in certain working conditions. In
Gem City Chemicals, Inc.,172 for example, the employer tried to uni-
laterally implement a drug testing policy as part of the employees'
annual safety physicals.' 17 3 An employee refused to be tested for drugs
during his scheduled physical exam and was subsequently dis-
charged. 74 The union objected to the unilateral implementation of
the policy, arguing that employee drug testing was a safety matter and
that it was subject to bargaining as were all other safety matters under
the collective bargaining agreement. 75 Examining the agreement's
purpose in requiring physicals, the arbitrator concluded that the pur-
pose of the rule was to determine if the employee had suffered any
adverse effects from the handling of toxic chemicals. 176 Management
argued that drug testing was necessary to promote a safe work-
place. 7 7 The arbitrator used management's argument, however, to
conclude that if the purpose of drug testing was safety, then manage-
ment was prohibited from implementing the policy because the collec-
tive bargaining agreement required the parties to bargain over all
changes to safety matters. 178 Management argued alternatively that
drug testing could be imposed as a management right pursuant to the
provision of the collective bargaining agreement that prohibited ille-
gal drugs or intoxication on the job. 1 79 The arbitrator held that man-
agement could test for drugs under its management's rights clause if
management had probable cause to believe that the employee was
under the influence and if management gave the employee fair and
adequate notice prior to testing.180 In sum, the arbitrator concluded
that management had exceeded its contract rights by requiring all
employees to be tested for drugs without a showing of individualized
probable cause. 181
172. 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1023 (1986) (Warns, Arb.).
173. Id. at 1024.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1023-24.





181. Id. at 1026. The arbitrator also ordered the employer to reinstate the employee. Id.
Another example of this general approach can be seen in Philips Industries, Inc., 90 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 222 (1988) (DiLeone, Arb.). The company unilaterally implemented a drug and
alcohol testing policy for all employees without consulting with the union. Id. at 224. The
arbitrator concluded:
Whenever there is an implementation of a program which is not expressly
provided for in the agreement, and it directly affects the conditions of
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Notwithstanding the cases discussed, the majority of published
arbitration opinions examined make no mention of a duty to bargain
under either the NLRA or the parties' contract.1 82  Instead, arbitra-
tors apply notions of reasonableness in interpreting collective bargain-
ing agreements.18 3
B. Reasonableness of the Drug Testing Program
In addition to challenges based on either a statutory or contrac-
tual duty to bargain, a union may challenge the validity of a drug
testing program by bringing a Section 8(d) claim with the NLRB; this
type of claim would be based on a unilateral change in working condi-
tions during the term of a collective bargaining agreement.1 84  A
union may also dispute management's action pursuant to a grievance
and arbitration clause in its collective bargaining agreement. The
union may even pursue both remedies simultaneously. Regardless of
the theory used, the majority of the cases are ultimately disputed in
arbitration.'18  The balance of this Section will therefore focus on how
employment, one cannot go so far as to conclude that Management can
superimpose certain conditions of employment under a plant rules clause or a
Management rights clause without Union participation.
Id. at 225. The arbitrator held that the drug policy unilaterally implemented by management
was a violation of the agreement. Id.
182. See supra notes 159-60.
183. See supra note 154.
184. Section 8(d) of the NLRA states:
Obligation to bargain collectively. For the purposes of this section, to bargain
collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the
representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement ....
NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). For a discussion of drug testing as a mandatory subject of
bargaining, see supra note 9.
185. If the union brings a Section 8(d) claim before the NLRB, the NLRB can either hear
the complaint and issue a ruling or defer the dispute to the arbitrator. Under the deferral
doctrine enunciated in Collyer Wire and its progeny, the tendency of the NLRB has been to
defer action in those cases in which the collective bargaining agreement provides for
arbitration. See Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971) (policy of the NLRB to
defer to arbitrators all unfair labor practice disputes in which there was an arbitration
provision in the labor agreement). See generally Edwards, Deferral to Arbitration and Waiver
of the Duty to Bargain: A Possible Way Out of Everlasting Confusion at the NLRB, 46 OHIO
ST. L.J. 23 (1985) (discussing deferral theory); Peck, A Proposal to End NLRB Deferral to the
Arbitration Process, 60 WASH. L. REV. 355 (1985) (discussing deferral theory). The General
Counsel noted in her Advice Memorandum that, absent injunctive relief, deferral policies still
apply. Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 184, at D-1 (Sept. 24, 1987). Thus, should the Board
exercise its option to defer under Collyer Wire, the union may be worse off-in terms of time
spent-than if the union initially sought arbitration.
If the NLRB decides to hear the complaint, the Board may read the management rights
clause liberally and rule in favor of the employer. See Milwaukee Spring Div. of Ill. Coil
Spring Co., 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984) (Milwaukee Spring I) (rights not specifically granted to
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arbitrators have interpreted the validity of management imposed drug
testing programs.
Within a collective bargaining agreement, even in those cases in
which arbitrators have given management the entitlement to imple-
ment drug testing unilaterally pursuant to a broad reading of a "man-
agement rights" clause or other contractual language, the nature and
scope of drug testing is often constrained by contractual language that
provides that employers may not discipline or terminate employees
without "just cause."' 18 6 In Vulcan Materials Co., 8 7 for example, an
employer had unilaterally implemented a drug testing policy that
included random testing.188 A provision of the collective bargaining
agreement provided that the employer could not discipline or dis-
charge an employee without "just cause," a situation that led the arbi-
trator to conclude: "The just cause rule is an integral part of the
Drug and Alcohol Program. Any rule or regulation imposed by the
company is subject to the individual rights of the employee. The
necessity of the program and its adoption does not abdicate these
rights."' 189
the union in the collective bargaining agreement are retained by management), aff'd sub noma.
UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Although the union would argue that the
implementation of the drug testing program was not based upon the economic factors that
precipitated Milwaukee Spring II, management could argue strongly that economic losses
caused by employee absenteeism, decreased productivity, accidents, and increased liability to
third persons justified the program. See Lynch, supra note 147, at 285-92.
186. See Department of the Army, 91 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 137 (1988) (Huffcut, Arb.); Vulcan
Materials Co., 90 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1161 (1988) (Caraway, Arb.); Sanford Corp., 89 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 968 (1987) (Wies, Arb.) (employer had "just cause" to discipline but not to discharge
employee); North County Transit Dist., 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 768 (1987) (Collins, Arb.);
Trailways, Inc., 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1073 (1987) (Goodman, Arb.); Day & Zimmermann,
Inc., 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1001 (1987) (Heinsz, Arb.); Union Plaza Hotel, 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
528 (1986) (McKay, Arb.) (employer had "just cause" to discipline but not to discharge
employee); Gem City Chems., Inc., 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1023 (1986) (Warns, Arb.);
Weyerhauser Co., 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 182 (1985) (Levin, Arb.); CFS Continental, Inc., 86-1
Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8070 (1985) (Lumbley, Arb.); Gulf Oil Prods. Co., 85-2 Lab. Arb.
Awards (CCH) 8481 (1985) (Holman, Arb.).
Some arbitrators have held, however, that the employer had "just cause" to discharge its
employee. See Regional Transp. Dist., 91 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 213 (1988) (Goldstein, Arb.);
Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., 88-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8204 (1987) (Kindig, Arb.);
Texas City Ref., Inc., 87-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8609 (1987) (Milentz, Arb.);
Metropolitan Transit Auth., 87-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8472 (1987) (Baroni, Arb.);
Albuquerque Mailers Union Local No. 156, 87-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8427 (1987)
(Fogleberg, Arb.); Citgo Petroleum Corp., 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 521 (1986) (Allen, Arb.);
Concrete Pipe Prods. Co., 87 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 601 (1986) (Caraway, Arb.); Indianapolis
Power & Light Co., 86-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8507 (1986) (Volz, Arb.).
187. 90 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1161, 1161 (1988) (Caraway, Arb.).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1166. Because the company had violated the "just cause" provision of the
collective bargaining agreement, the arbitrator directed that the company cease its policy of
random drug testing. Id. at 1167.
1989]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
In the drug testing context, arbitrators have defined "just cause"
in a variety of ways. One arbitrator has defined "just cause" as
"essentially a standard of reasonableness and fairness."' 9 ° Another
arbitrator, emphasizing the necessity that all drug testing programs be
reasonable, has stated: "[A]n Employer generally has the right to
make reasonable rules of conduct for its Employees, and it may
enforce those rules through disciplinary action .... [I]t is also gener-
ally accepted that the rules of conduct for Employees must reasonably
be related to the safe and efficient operations of the Employer.' ' 91
Yet another arbitrator has stated: "The basic tests for reasonableness
are those of arbitrariness, capriciousness and discrimination. It is also
fair to say that its method of application is implicit, as no law is any
better than its application." '92 Thus, once arbitrators determine that
a contract entitles management to require drug testing, the reasona-
bleness of the program determines whether the employer has the ulti-
mate entitlement to test or the employee has the ultimate entitlement
not to be tested.
The reasonableness of a drug test is best examined from two per-
spectives: (1) whether it is reasonable to require a drug test of the
individual employee; and (2) whether the procedures used before, dur-
ing, and after the drug test are reasonable in all aspects.'93 The first
inquiry concerns whether there is reasonable suspicion or other
unique circumstances to justify the testing of an employee. The sec-
190. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 86-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8507, at 5140
(1986) (Volz, Arb.).
191. Maple Meadow Mining, 90 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 873, 879 (1988) (Phelan, Arb.)
(emphasis added).
192. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 845, 848 (1987) (Boals, Arb.).
193. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co., 91 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1385 (1989) (Baroni, Arb.). In Dow,
the arbitrator stated:
[The] "balancing of interests" approach, which has developed within the federal
circuits, assesses whether a drug test is justified, from a need perspective, based
upon two identified factors:
a) The nature of the industry and work environment;
b) The evidence of an existing drug problem, in terms of the seriousness and
extent of it. Once a test has been justified as needed, the courts inquire into the
reasonableness of the process itself. Among the many factors affecting the
outcome of this inquiry are:
a) The extent to which the employer may exercise discretion in choosing
subjects or interpreting results;
b) The accuracy of the testing;
c) The uniformity of the testing ...





ond inquiry concerns the reasonableness of the application of the drug
testing process as a whole.
1. WAS THERE A REASONABLE BASIS TO TEST FOR DRUGS?
Arbitrators have upheld drug testing administered pursuant to
an existing labor agreement, 94 pursuant to an employee's consent to
be tested, 95 or pursuant to a union's waiver of its right to protest the
program.1 96 Absent these factors, arbitrators generally require indi-
vidualized reasonable suspicion before an employer may require an
employee to submit to a drug test. 7'9 Arguably, arbitrators are
implicitly following similar standards enunciated in public law doc-
trine. Like the federal courts, arbitrators have upheld drug testing
programs that were based upon a showing of reasonable suspicion
that the employee to be tested is under the influence of drugs or alco-
hol prior to the administering of the drug test.'
98
194. See Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., 88-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8204 (Kindig, Arb.)
(The discharge of an employee was upheld because the employee had refused to be tested
pursuant to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.).
195. See Deaconess Medical Center, 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 44 (1986) (Robinson, Arb.) (A
nurse's admission to having used marijuana provided reasonable cause for a hospital to require
the nurse's consent to random testing.).
196. A union may be held to have consented to a management imposed drug policy by
failing to object in a timely manner. See Texas City Ref., Inc., 87-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH)
8609 (1987) (Milentz, Arb.) (The union could not challenge the implementation of a drug
policy that had been in place for eight months without being contested; hence, the arbitrator
limited the issue to whether the program was reasonable.).
197. As stated by one arbitrator:
Arbitrators are not requiring employers to have sufficient evidence to
support a criminal indictment before they compel an employee to undergo a drug
test. Nor do they seek evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. They do not even
look for a preponderance of the evidence to show that the employee is guilty of
the charge against him. All they want to know is that the employer has some
rational grounds for testing the employee, not whim or caprice, not unfounded
suspicion or discriminatory motive, not ancient superstitions or old wives' tales.
In short, is the employer acting like a reasonable man, seeking to protect his
business and recognizing that the employees also have rights which are entitled
to protection?
Warehouse Distrib. Centers, Inc., 90 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 979, 982 (1987) (Weiss, Arb.); see-also
infra notes 198-203 and accompanying text.
198. See Regional Transp. Dist., 91 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 213 (1988) (Goldstein, Arb.) (Erratic
behavior coupled with an accident provided reasonable suspicion to test a bus driver.);
Metropolitan Transit Auth., 87-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8472 (1987) (Baroni, Arb.)
(Direct observation of erratic behavior, red eyes, and slurred speech provided reasonable cause
to test a bus driver.); Albuquerque Mailers Union Local No. 156, 87-2 Lab. Arb. Awards
(CCH) 8427 (1987) (Fogleberg, Arb.) (Observed abnormal behavior provided reasonable
suspicion to test at a publishing company.); Citgo Petroleum Corp., 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 521
(1986) (Allen, Arb.) (Direct observation at a petroleum facility of a confused, stumbling,
unsteady employee with slurred speech and blinking eyes provided reasonable suspicion to
test.).
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In support of an individualized suspicion standard, arbitrators
have placed a high value on the interests of employees in doing as they
please when off duty; this holds true, however, only as long as the
employees' behavior does not adversely affect the employer and as
long as the employees are not impaired at work.1 99 Many arbitrators
find that subjecting employees to drug testing not based on individual-
ized suspicion is an attempt to regulate the employees' off duty con-
duct.2" Many of the published opinions examined hold that there
must be a nexus between a positive test result and job impairment
before an employee may be discharged.2 °' Additionally, several arbi-
199. See Maple Meadow Mining, 90 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 873 (1988) (Phelan, Arb.)
(sustaining union's grievance in which management had unilaterally implemented a policy that
required all employees returning to work from absence or layoff to be tested for drugs although
there was no reasonable suspicion). The arbitrator in Maple Meadow stated that "[employers]
may not regulate the conduct of Employees away from the job except where such conduct has
some relation to job performance or workplace operations or where it may adversely affect the
Employer's business." Id. at 879; see also Trailways, Inc., 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1073, 1083
(1987) (Goodman, Arb.) (Employee's discharge was unjust because neither the company's
rules nor DOT regulations banned the use of marijuana off-premises or during non-working
hours, and "there [was] not a scintilla of evidence to establish that the employee was under the
influence when he reported for work."); Weyerhauser Co., 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 182, 189
(1985) (Levin, Arb.) ("[T]he Company must prove the employee cannot perform his work
because of drug use. That is the whole point in the rule. The 'off duty' conduct must affect the
work performance."); CFS Continental, Inc., 86-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8070, at 3297
(1985) (Lumbley, Arb.) (There was no basis to discharge an employee for drug use away from
work absent a showing that drug use impaired the employer's reputation, the employee's
ability to perform, or the employee's willingness to work with the employer.).
200. See supra note 199.
201. See Department of the Army, 91 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 137 (1988) (Huffcut, Arb.); Vulcan
Materials Co., 90 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1161 (1988) (Caraway, Arb.); Maple Meadow Mining, 90
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 873 (1988) (Phelan, Arb.); International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local
Union No. 351, 88-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8318 (1988) (Williams, Arb.); North County
Transit Dist., 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 768 (1987) (Collins, Arb.); Trailways, Inc., 88 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 1073 (1987) (Goodman, Arb.); Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1001
(1987) (Heinsz, Arb.); ITT Barton Instruments, Co., 88-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8013
(1987) (Draznin, Arb.); Gem City Chems., Inc., 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1023 (1986) (Warns,
Arb.); Weyerhauser Co., 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 182 (1985) (Levin, Arb.); CFS Continental, Inc.,
86-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8070 (1985) (Lumbley, Arb.); Inspiration Consol. Copper
Co., 85-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8534 (1985) (Tamoush, Arb.).
One arbitrator noted "that many arbitrators take the position that nexus with work or
employer interests must also be present along with evidence of alcohol or other substance
symptoms; i.e. a positive test standing alone is not just cause for discharge in their thinking."
Young Insulation Group, Inc., 88-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8205, at 4030 (1987) (Boals,
Arb.). For example, a positive test for marijuana only means that the person was exposed to
the drug at some time during the past month. Marathon Petroleum Co., 87-2 Lab. Arb.
Awards (CCH) 8549, at 6223 (1987) (Grimes, Arb.). Thus, a person can test positive based
upon "off duty" conduct and not necessarily be currently impaired, and as arbitrator Grimes
noted:
It is recognized that the higher the nanogram reading [measuring a substance's
presence], the more recent the use, although experts agree it is not possible to
pinpoint time of use from urine test data. The marijuana metabolites have a
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trators have placed great value upon the right of the employee not to
be forced to give incriminating and highly personal evidence against
himself, via drug testing, without just cause.2 °2 As one arbitrator
stated:
The difficulty involved in requiring all employees involuntarily to
take a drug screen is that this is requiring employees to submit to a
test and place their medical situation on record with the conse-
quent possibility of incriminating themselves in terms of illegal
drugs without probable cause on the job to suspect that any of the
individuals are in fact taking drugs.20 3
These arbitrators have given to private sector employees an additional
entitlement that is not found in the breadth of current judicial inter-
pretations, which hold that urinalysis is neither testimonial nor com-
municative under the fifth amendment. 2°
Like the preceding federal opinions, the cases in which individu-
alized suspicion is absent can be divided generally into three catego-
ries: (1) testing within highly regulated industries; (2) testing
pursuant to either a job-related physical or the happening of an acci-
dent; and (3) testing that is justified by societal concerns for public
safety. Although a direct comparison between federal and arbitral
decisions is not always possible,2 °5 there are strong similarities
between the decisions of the two forums.
In cases involving heavily regulated industries, such as nuclear
power plants, at least one arbitrator has expressly followed federal
precedent to uphold drug testing with less than individualized suspi-
"half-life" in the body that means significant traces of them diminish enough to
produce a negative reading in a "recreational" user in 10 days to two weeks. A
heavy user of marijuana might possibly have traces in his body for up to 30 days.
Id.
One scholar in this area has argued that drug tests do not address the difficulty in measur-
ing a person's impairment caused by drug use, stating: "The bias against 'experiential' models
of drug effects reflects a conceptual reductionism of human beings to mere components or
parts (body or mind) reacting like machines to drug stimuli in standardized fashion." S.
WISOTSKY, BREAKING THE IMPASSE IN THE WAR ON DRUGS 19-20 (1986).
202. See Vulcan Materials Co., 90 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1161, 1166 (1988) (Caraway, Arb.)
("When an employee is required to undergo urinalysis for a drug or alcohol test without
probable cause or reasonable suspicion, he is required to give evidence against himself. He
must prove his innocence before any discipline is imposed."); Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 88
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1001, 1008 (1987) (Heinsz, Arb.) ("[T]he Grievant's reasonable right not to
have the burden of proof to demonstrate her fitness or of proving her innocence of a rule
violation and the highly intrusive nature of mandatory, random testing outweigh the
Company's interest in such a rule."); see also infra note 203 and accompanying text.
203. Gem City Chems., Inc., 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1023, 1025 (1986) (Warns, Arb.).
204. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
205. In contrast to numerous published federal court opinions, for example, there are few
published drug testing cases involving heavily regulated industries in the arbitration reporters.
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cion.20 6 In International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local
Union No. 647,207 the arbitrator gave management the entitlement to
randomly test employees who had unescorted access to the sensitive
areas of a nuclear power plant.20 The arbitrator drew heavily from
Rushton v. Nebraska Public Power District2°9 and found that the
employees had "a diminished expectation of privacy given the nature
and place of their employment. '210  The arbitrator balanced public
interest and safety over the privacy intrusion caused by urine testing
without probable cause.2'
The second category of cases involves testing that was conducted
pursuant to either a regularly scheduled physical or the happening of
a specific event. In these cases, the employer is given the entitlement
to test because a regular job physical or the increased suspicion result-
ing from a job-related accident or injury results in a reduction of the
intrusion into an employee's privacy. This lessening of individual
rights in favor of societal concerns for drug testing in the absence of
particularized suspicion has been followed by some arbitrators.21 2 In
Griffin Pipe Products Co.,23 the employer, a foundry, unilaterally
amended its work rules to require employees injured on the job to be
tested for drugs as part of their medical treatment.21 4 In support of
the employer, the arbitrator stated that "there is no doubt that the
Company has a serious responsibility to provide for the welfare and
safety of its employees. ' ' 2 5  The arbitrator noted that the program
206. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 647, 87-2 Lab. Arb. Awards
(CCH) 8570 (1987) (Weisbrod, Arb.); see also Utility Workers Union, Local No. 357, 89-2
Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 4992 (1988) (Fraser, Arb.) (The portion of management's program
that required drug testing of office and clerical personnel who had unrestricted access to a
nuclear power plant was unreasonable under the collective bargaining agreement.).
207. 87-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8570 (1987) (Weisbrod, Arb.).
208. Id. at 6323-24.
209. 653 F. Supp. 1510 (D. Neb. 1987), aff'd, 844 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1988).
210. 87-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8570, at 6323.
211. Id.
212. In these cases, strong safety concerns coupled with a minimized privacy intrusion
supported the drug testing policy. See Marathon Petroleum Co., 87-2 Lab. Arb. Awards
(CCH) 8549 (1987) (Grimes, Arb.) (The discovery of marijuana in the control room of a
petroleum plant justified the testing of all workers assigned to that area.); Concrete Pipe Prods.
Co., 87 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 601 (1986) (Caraway, Arb.) (It is reasonable to test any driver of a
tractor-trailer involved in an accident.); Griffin Pipe Prods. Co., 83-1 Lab. Arb. Awards
(CCH) 8616 (1982) (Daly, Arb.) (Although there was no specific grievant in this case, the
arbitrator upheld a company's right to test those involved in accidents as a matter of policy.).
But see Gem City Chems., Inc., 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1023 (1986) (Warns, Arb.) (sustaining
grievance because the testing of all employees at a chemical plant during their safety physicals
was not justified by individualized suspicion).
213. 83-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8616 (1982) (Daly, Arb.).
214. Id. at 5742.
215. Id. at 5746.
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only intrudes minimally upon the employees because: "[T]he drug
test is not given to all employees or indiscriminately to some employ-
ees. It is given only to those employees who have had an accident in
the plant."2 6 Although there were no individual grievants in Griffin
Pipe, the arbitrator sustained the entitlement of the employer to test
for drugs pursuant to job-related injuries.2" 7 The cases in this cate-
gory, although few in number, are reasoned in a manner analogous to
the corresponding court cases that uphold the testing.
Within the third group of arbitration cases, the inherently dan-
gerous nature of certain businesses poses a significant risk of injury to
people and property. In these cases, arbitrators have been divided
over permitting non-individualized or random testing. In Day &
Zimmermann, Inc.,28 the arbitrator gave to the employees the enti-
tlement not to be tested without individualized reasonable suspi-
cion.219 The arbitrator struck down the employer's random testing
program, concluding that the employer's interest in the test was out-
weighed by the degree of intrusion into the employee's privacy and by
the necessity of an employee to prove his own fitness or innocence.22°
The arbitrator did note that because of the nature of the job-manu-
facturing explosives for the United States Army-the threshold for
testing employees was very low and employers could test when
employees showed the slightest signs of possible impairment. 22' In
contrast, in South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. ,222 the employer imple-
mented a random drug testing program for "all" bus drivers.223 The
arbitrator upheld the random testing of bus drivers as reasonable
when balanced against public safety concerns:
An employer whose employees possess the potential to be a safety
threat to the general public because of physical condition ... has
both the obligation and the right to assure that the danger does not
exist by requiring appropriate tests of employees in such jobs. In
short, public safety assurance is a proper and reasonable restriction
on privacy rights regarding bus drivers, as it is a privilege and not a
right to carry passengers for economic gain.224
216. Id.
217. Id. at 5746-47.
218. 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1001 (1987) (Heinsz, Arb.) (grievance sustained).
219. Id. at 1008.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 845 (1987) (Boals, Arb.).
223. Id. at 847.
224. Id. at 848. Note that there is a strong similarity between the values given to public
safety by the arbitrator in South Carolina Electric and by the court in Transport Workers'
Union, Local 234 v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 863 F.2d 1110 (3d
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Similarly, in Texas City Refining, Inc,225 the arbitrator gave the
employer the entitlement to randomly test employees at a petroleum
facility.22 6 The arbitrator noted the potential for great disaster at a
petroleum facility, stating: "[T]he presence of drugs on the job must
be recognized as a potential cause for serious emergency and cannot
be ignored. Therefore, this type of off the job behavior is not beyond
the control of the Company." '22 7 Within this category, the arbitrators
have not defined any trend as to where to place the entitlement. Even
the more recent opinions go both ways. 228 Because federal precedent
is not yet rooted in this area, it can be predicted that these cases will
continue to be divided.
Finally, absent individualized suspicion or deference to heavily
regulated industries or safety concerns, arbitrators, like the courts,
have struck down employer imposed sanctions when employees were
tested unreasonably.2 2 9 In these instances, arbitrators have affirmed
the requirement of individualized suspicion as a standard upon which
to test. The relative rights of employers and employees seem to
depend upon the nature of the workplace in which the drug testing is
to occur and upon the personal intrusion that could occur. Both arbi-
trators and the courts agree that an employer can require an employee
to submit to a drug test when there is individualized reasonable suspi-
cion that the employee is impaired due to drugs or alcohol and the
Cir. 1988) (SEPTA), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 109 S. Ct. 3208 (1989). See infra
notes 254-60.
225. 87-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8609 (1987) (Milentz, Arb.).
226. Id. at 6504.
227. Id. at 6503.
228. Although the industry may be hazardous and pose safety concerns, arbitrators are still
unsettled as to where to place the entitlement. One arbitrator, for example, recently held that
it was reasonable to randomly drug test all employees at a plant that manufactures both toxic
and explosive chemicals. Dow Chem. Co., 91 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1385 (1989) (Baroni, Arb.).
In contrast, in a case involving a nuclear power plant, another arbitrator held that it was
unreasonable to subject office and clerical employees to drug testing during their annual
physicals although the employees had unescorted access to the plant. Utility Workers Union,
Local No. 387, 89-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8406 (1988) (Fraser, Arb.).
229. See Department of the Army, 91 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 137 (1988) (Huffcut, Arb.)
(sustaining grievance in which certain civilians in security related positions at an army depot
were tested without individualized suspicion and no evidence of prior drug abuse existed);
Vulcan Materials Co., 90 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1161 (1988) (Caraway, Arb.) (holding that random
testing of all employees at a chemical plant absent individualized suspicion was not
reasonable); Trailways, Inc., 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1073 (1987) (Goodman, Arb.) (sustaining
grievance because an unsubstantiated assertion by a another employee did not constitute
reasonable suspicion to test bus drivers); CFS Continental, Inc., 86-1 Lab. Arb. Awards
(CCH) 8070 (1985) (Lumbley, Arb.) (sustaining grievance for lack of individualized
suspicion where a food distributor tested only specific groups).
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resulting impairment affects the workplace.230 Likewise, arbitrators
have reasoned analogously to the courts in upholding drug testing
mandated by employers with less than individualized suspicion when
the industry is highly regulated and poses societal concerns. 231 Also
like the courts, arbitrators have upheld drug testing absent individual-
ized suspicion when the nature of a business poses safety concerns to
others, and the drug testing program is coupled with a less intrusive
means of testing (such as testing during job-related physicals or test-
ing based upon a higher level of suspicion resulting from the happen-
ing of a specific event).232 Similarly, the potential impairment of an
employee within certain workplaces poses significant public safety
concerns that justify testing absent particularized suspicion.2 33
Finally, absent individualized suspicion or one of the above-men-
tioned exceptions, both the courts and arbitrators are divided as to
where to place the entitlement in the drug testing area.234 Generally,
the greater the potential harm from a possibly impaired worker, the
lesser the degree of individualized suspicion that is required for test-
ing to occur.235
2. IS THE APPLICATION OF THE PROGRAM REASONABLE?
Like the courts, arbitrators focus upon whether the procedures
230. Compare supra note 42 and accompanying text (federal courts) with supra note 198
and accompanying text (arbitration).
231. Compare supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text (federal courts) with supra notes
206-11 and accompanying text (arbitration).
232. Compare supra notes 63-80 and accompanying text (federal courts) with supra notes
212-17 and accompanying text (arbitration).
233. Compare supra notes 81-92 and accompanying text (federal courts) with supra notes
218-28 and accompanying text (arbitration).
234. Compare supra notes 93-100 and accompanying text (federal courts) with supra note
229 and accompanying text (arbitration).
235. See, e.g., Ensor v. Rust Eng'g Co., 704 F. Supp. 808, 813-14 (E.D. Tenn. 1989). In
Ensor, the district court adopted the Sixth Circuit's balancing approach:
We believe there must be a focus on the particular nature of the employment
sector to be tested. More specifically, there must be an inquiry into the harm that
will result to society if mandatory drug tests are not allowed in that industry.
The higher the cost and the more irretrievable the loss, the stronger the argument
for finding reasonable the initiation of a drug testing program.... As the harm to
society of not conducting the search of an individual increases to potentially
catastrophic levels, the less willing is society to consider reasonable that
individual's subjective expectations of privacy.
Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 846 F.2d 1539, 1546-47 (6th Cir. 1988) (emphasis added),
quoted with approval in Ensor, 704 F. Supp. at 813-14. Compare Ensor, 704 F. Supp. at 813-14
with Dow Chem. Co., 91 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1385, 1389 (1989) (Baroni, Arb.) ("The reasonable-
ness of drug tests must largely be determined by safety considerations involving the nature of the
industry and work environment, and any evidence of a drug problem within the work areas.")
(emphasis added).
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used before, during, and after drug testing are reasonable and whether
the testing program is applied in an arbitrary or capricious manner.
2 36
Arbitrators have held that employees who must submit to a drug test
are entitled to a test that is accurate, reliable, procedurally just, and
given in a fair and nondiscriminatory manner.237
Arbitrators accord private sector employees many of the same
procedural due process protections that their public sector counter-
238parts receive. 8 Arbitrators have overturned employee discharges
when the employees were not given fair and adequate notice of man-
agement's drug testing policy, 239 the consequences of a positive test,
2 4°
or the prohibition against the off duty use of drugs. 24 ' Likewise, arbi-
trators have held it improper to discharge an employee without giving
him the requisite number of warnings pursuant to the employer's poi-
236. Compare supra notes 108-43 and accompanying text (due process in federal courts)
with infra notes 237-44 (arbitration).
237. One arbitrator has stated the requirements for an employee to be discharged with "just
cause:"
(1) The employee must be forewarned. (2) Employer's position with respect to
employee's conduct must be reasonable. (3) Employer investigated before
discharge. (4) Investigation was fair. (5) Substantial evidence supports the charge
against the employee. (6) There was no discrimination. (7) The degree of
discipline was reasonably related to the nature of the offense and the employee's
past record.
Misco, Inc., 88-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8503, at 5506 (1988) (Milden, Arb.) (citations
omitted).
Due process concerns were raised in many of the arbitration cases involving employee
drug testing. See International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local Union No. 351, 88-2 Lab.
Arb. Awards (CCH) 8318 (1988) (Williams, Arb.); Sanford Corp., 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 968
(1987) (Wies, Arb.); Young Insulation Group, Inc., 88-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8205
(1987) (Boals, Arb.); Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1433, 87-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH)
8510 (1987) (Speroff, Arb.); Union Plaza Hotel, 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 528 (1986) (McKay,
Arb.); Union Oil Co., 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 91 (1986) (Weiss, Arb.); Bay Area Rapid Transit
Dist., 87-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8084 (1986) (Concepcion, Arb.); Inspiration Consol.
Copper Co., 85-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8534 (1985) (Tamoush, Arb.).
238. For a discussion of federal due process, see supra notes 109-36 and accompanying text
239. See Union Oil Co., 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 91 (1986) (Weiss, Arb.). The employer had
subjected all of its employees at two of its remote petroleum sites to surprise drug testing. Id.
at 92. The arbitrator held that the program was void because the union had no notice of the
program and because the program was not implemented pursuant to any published policy of
management. Id. at 95; see also Donaldson Mining Co., 91 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 471, 476 (1988)
(Zobrak, Arb.) ("[T]he Company cannot demand compliance with a policy that has not been
communicated to the affected employees nor can the affected employees be disciplined for
violating a policy they do not know exists.").
240. See Sanford Corp., 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 968 (1987) (Wies, Arb.) (The employer failed
to communicate the consequences of refusing to take a drug test to the employee.).
241. See Trailways, Inc., 88-Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1073 (1987) (Goodman, Arb.) (unfair to
punish the employee for using drugs off duty when neither the company nor the Department of
Transportation had any rules or published policy to that effect).
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icy"' or without allowing him the opportunity to participate in a
rehabilitation program in accordance with company policy. 24 3 A test-
ing program can be procedurally unreasonable if proper procedures
are not followed to insure the validity of the results. As stated by one
arbitrator, in order to demonstrate that the procedures were "reliable
and proper,''24 an employer must show that the chain of custody and
storage of the testing sample were proper and that false readings were
minimized.245
Arbitrators have used an analysis similar to constitutional sub-
stantive due process when striking down drug testing programs that
were applied in a discriminatory or capricious manner.246 For exam-
ple, in cases in which employers have treated employees arbitrarily or
unfairly, arbitrators have reduced the penalties by ordering the
employees to be reinstated. 247 Additionally, a drug testing program
can be substantively unreasonable in the administration of the test. In
Union Plaza Hotel,z4 8 for example, a hotel required a waitress to sub-
mit to a drug test because of her erratic behavior.249 The arbitrator
found that forcing the employee to provide a urine sample in a highly
embarrassing manner was unreasonable. 25 ° The arbitrator stated that
242. See Warehouse Distrib. Centers, Inc., 90 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 979 (1987) (Weiss, Arb.)
(Although the company had reasonable cause to test, it was required to reinstate the employee
because the company had not followed its own procedures, which required two warnings prior
to any discharge.).
243. See Boise Cascade Corp., 90 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 791 (1988) (Nicholas, Arb.) (An
employee was reinstated because the employee had not been given the opportunity to
participate in the company's rehabilitation program.); South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 89
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 845 (1987) (Boals, Arb.) (A discharge was reduced to a disciplinary layoff
because the employer had denied the employee an opportunity to participate in the
contractually provided rehabilitative program.).
244. Metropolitan Transit Auth., 87-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8472, at 5873 (1987)
(Baroni, Arb.).
245. Id.
246. See, e.g., ITT Barton Instruments, Co., 88-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8013 (1987)
(Draznin, Arb.) (It was arbitrary to treat employees that had been laid off for more than 30
days as "new hires."); Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist., 87-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8084, at
3342 (1986) (Concepcion, Arb.) (A drug testing program was arbitrarily applied only to union
employees, and the program did not account for job classifications-such as clerical-that had
no bearing on safety.). For a similar view, compare supra notes 137-43 and accompanying text
which discuss federal substantive due process.
247. See Young Insulation Group, Inc., 88-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8205 (1987)
(Boals, Arb.) (employee was reinstated and awarded back pay and benefits); Inspiration
Consol. Copper Co., 85-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8534, at 5207 (1985) (Tamoush, Arb.)
(employee was reinstated, but without back pay).
248. 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 528 (1986) (McKay, Arb.).
249. The waitress was wandering around with a coffee pot, but she did not pour any coffee
for the customers. Id. at 530. Moreover, the waitress was sullen, had glassy eyes, and was
dancing before the customers claiming to be a gazelle. Id.
250. Although the arbitrator held that directly monitoring the giving of the urine sample is
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"[w]hen the Union agreed to drug testing, it did not waive its mem-
bers' rights to preserve a reasonable amount of privacy and dignity in
the testing process." 25 ' The arbitrator ordered the employee rein-
stated, but without back pay.252
In sum, although an employer may have cause to test an
employee, the test employed must be procedurally reliable and prop-
erly administered, and the test must be applied in a fair and nondis-
criminatory manner; otherwise, the test will not withstand scrutiny
when challenged. The values that arbitrators have exhibited are very
similar to the procedural and substantive due process rights given to
public employees by the courts.25 3
IV. ANALYSIS
The ongoing tension between society's interest in eradicating
drugs in the workplace and the individual right of privacy can be best
demonstrated in two conflicting opinions involving bus and transpor-
tation operators. In South Carolina Electric & Gas Co.,254 manage-
ment had unilaterally implemented random drug testing of all bus
drivers whose duties fell under governmental regulations.255 In inter-
preting the collective bargaining agreement, the arbitrator focused on
whether the test was reasonable as administered. 256 The arbitrator
placed a very high value on safety for the public good, finding that it
outweighed the privacy rights of the individual:
It is not mere dicta to say that a person has natural rights of
privacy in addition to 4th Amendment protections of unlawful
search and seizure and 5th Amendment immunity from testifying
against oneself. Although these protections ordinarily apply to
threatened government intrusions, it is appropriate to extend them
to employers who are franchised natural monopolies ....
Now the rights mentioned above are not unlimited rights.
Just as one cannot shout "fire" in a crowded theater, one cannot
use those rights to jeopardize the safety of others.257
not unreasonable in itself, it was unreasonable in this instance because the employee was
wearing only a leotard undergarment and she would have had to completely disrobe. Id. at
534. Denying her request for a robe or a private room was unreasonable. Id.
251. Id. Pursuant to the parties' collective bargaining agreement, "the Employer can
generally require that employees suspected of substance abuse provide a urine sample while
under observation by clinic personnel." Id. The arbitrator qualified this, however, by requiring
that the test be applied in a reasonable manner. Id.
252. Id. at 535.
253. Cf. supra notes 108-43 and accompanying text.
254. 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 845 (1987) (Boals, Arb.).
255. Id. at 846.




The arbitrator noted that scientific data indicated that habitual users
of marijuana could experience a "deleterious and lingering effect on
physical dexterity and mental acuity. 258  Further, because it is
impossible to determine when marijuana was last used, it therefore
follows that it is "reasonable" to prohibit the employee from using it
at all. 259 In responding to the union's complaint regarding the valid-
ity of the test, the arbitrator found that the tests were accurate and
noted that if the screening test result was positive, the procedure
called for a second test of greater accuracy.2"
In comparison, in Trailways, Inc.,26 the company's District
Manager of Operations required six of its bus drivers to submit to
urinalysis testing.262 The manager ordered the tests when two
employees informed him that the six particular drivers were using
258. Id. at 849; compare id. with infra note 260.
259. Id.
260. Id. While upholding the employer's right to subject bus drivers to random drug
testing, the arbitrator in this case reduced the discharge to a penalty of suspension because the
employee had not been given an opportunity to participate in the company's rehabilitation
program pursuant to established policy. Id. The arbitrator found that the employer had
violated its employee's right to "due process" by failing to follow its own procedures. Id.
The arbitrator's reasoning compares with that of the Third Circuit in SEPTA, a case in
which the court upheld random drug testing of bus and train operators. Transport Workers'
Union, Local 234, v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 863 F.2d 1110 (3d Cir. 1988) (SEPTA).
There, the Third Circuit supported the drug testing policy upon a finding that the public
transportation company had suffered numerous train accidents resulting in great injury to the
public; the accidents had been caused by operating employees impaired by drugs or alcohol.
Id. at 1120. The court limited the random testing to those employed in sensitive positions such
as driver and engineer. Id. The court applied the two-part reasonableness test as set out by the
Supreme Court in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985). SEPTA, 863 F.2d at 1118.
In first examining the reasonableness of the drug test in its inception, the court stated: "[W]e
conclude that under the balancing required by the reasonableness analysis, if the state's interest
is substantial enough it may override even the intrusive searches required by urinalysis." Id. at
1119. The court found that the necessity to protect the travelling public is a higher state
interest than merely insuring a safe and efficient workplace. Id. The court further found that
"in light of the evidence connecting impairment with drug use," it was proper for the employer
to create a program to "detect drug users." Id. at 1120. Additionally, "the evidence of the
deleterious effect of drug use, and SEPTA's showing of positive tests for drugs or alcohol by
operating personnel at fault in accidents are sufficient bases ... to conclude that the random
testing policy is constitutionally justified at its inception." Id. at 1121 (emphasis added). In
looking at the second part of the test, the court focused on whether there were sufficient
procedural safeguards to protect the employees from unfettered abuse by employers. Id. at
1121-22. The court found that the program was reasonably applied to accomplish its purpose
of ferreting out drug users from sensitive positions. Id. at 1122. On certiorari, the United
States Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case pursuant to its holding in Consolidated
Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives' Association, 109 S. Ct. 2477 (1989). SEPTA, 109 S.
Ct. at 3208. On remand, the constitutionality of the random testing program should not be
affected.
261. 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1073 (1987) (Goodman, Arb.).
262. Id. at 1075.
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drugs.2 63 The employees who supplied the tip did not give any details
or specifics to justify their suspicion.2 4 No one in management had
seen the employees using drugs or acting in any impaired manner
while on the job.2 65 In examining the contract, the arbitrator found
no provision that allowed the employer to test for drugs at will. 26
The primary issue was whether there was probable cause to require
the grievants to submit to a drug test.26 7 In contrast to South Caro-
lina Electric & Gas, the Trailways arbitrator started with the basic
premise that an employee is entitled to his privacy away from the
work setting as an inherent right. The arbitrator specifically stated:
[W]e start with the basic observation that an employee does not
somehow abandon his right to privacy at the doorstep of the
employer's premises....
It is submitted that an individual, by signing on to an employ-
ment relationship, does not generally expect his or her private life
to be scrutinized by the employer, nor does the existence of an
employment relationship automatically entitle an employer to
reach beyond the workplace and dictate, by discipline, the private
lifestyles, morals and behavior of its employees.268
The arbitrator valued the individual's rights of privacy as preeminent
over safety concerns and concluded that there was no probable cause
to require the six bus drivers to undergo a urinalysis test for drugs.2 69
Even if the grievants were tested with probable cause, there remained
the issue of whether there was just cause for the employees' discharge.
The arbitrator, in giving great weight to the employees' presumptive
right of innocence, concluded that there was no nexus between the
mere positive test result and the conclusion that the grievants were
impaired while on the job.270 The arbitrator held that the grievants





266. Id. at 1080.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 1081. The arbitrator noted that the company lacked any personal knowledge
that the grievants were using drugs or were impaired by drugs; moreover, the company never
attempted to corroborate the tip prior to ordering the grievants to be tested. Id.
270. Id. at 1083. The arbitrator stated that "the contract, and not the scientific and medical
data, provided the necessary connection between test results and job impairment issues." Id.
271. Id. at 1084. The arbitrator also ordered that all personnel records of the previous
action be expunged. Id.
The reasoning employed by the arbitrator in Trailways should be compared with the
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A strong parallel may be drawn between what arbitrators have
explicitly and implicitly reasoned in deciding drug testing issues that
private employers face and similar reasoning used by the courts in
deciding comparable issues affecting public employers. Although
arbitrators are not bound to follow judicial precedent,272 it is more
than mere coincidence that arbitrators share many of the same con-
cerns and values as their judicial counterparts.
Arbitrators differ in the way that they interpret contract clauses
detailing management rights or health and safety in the workplace in
much the same way that language differs between contracts. 273 The
vast majority of the published decisions give employers the entitle-
ment to impose drug testing programs on their employees. Arbitra-
tors place a high value on the need to eradicate drug and alcohol
abuse from the workplace and to provide a safe work environment.274
This concern for safety is particularly evident in cases in which an
rationale of the Ninth Circuit in Railway Labor Executives' Association v. Burnley, 839 F.2d
575 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd sub nom. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association, 109 S.
Ct. 1402 (1989). In Burnley, the court struck down a drug testing program that subjected
transportation employees to drug testing absent individualized suspicion. Id. at 592. The
employer, a railroad, had amended its drug and alcohol program unilaterally to require that all
employees involved in certain job-related accidents or injuries be tested. Id. at 577. As in
SEPTA, the court performed a two-part balancing test to ascertain the reasonableness of the
program under the fourth amendment. Id. at 587. The Burnley court, however, gave greater
weight to individual privacy than to public safety concerns and held that the testing program
was not justified at its inception. Id. The court stated:
We hold that particularized suspicion is essential to finding toxicological testing
of railroad employees justified at its inception. Accidents, incidents, or rule
violations, by themselves, do not create reasonable grounds for suspecting that
tests will demonstrate alcohol or drug impairment in any one railroad employee,
much less an entire train crew.
Id. The court invalidated the drug testing program because it was not founded on individual-
ized suspicion. Id. at 592. On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed and held that individual-
ized suspicion is not an absolute requirement under the fourth amendment. Skinner v. Railway
Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
One arbitrator, applying the rule of individualized suspicion established in Burnley, struck
down a management policy that randomly tested bus drivers who had been involved in an
accident. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 89-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8117, at 3590
(1989) (Jones, Arb.). The arbitrator may have arrived at a different result, however, if the case
had been heard after Skinner was decided.
272. See generally F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 15 1, at 321-28 (discussing the use
of substantive law by arbitrators).
273. Compare Philips Indus., Inc., 90 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 222 (1988) (DiLeone, Arb.)
(contract read narrowly favoring the union) with Sanford Corp., 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 968
(1987) (Wies, Arb.) (contract read broadly favoring management).
274. See, e.g., South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 845 (1987) (Boals,
Arb.); International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 647, 87-2 Lab. Arb. Awards
(CCH) 8570 (1987) (Weisbrod, Arb.); Hopeman Bros., 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 373 (1986)
(Rothschild, Arb.); Concrete Pipe Prods. Co., 87 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 601 (1986) (Caraway,
Arb.).
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employee is unsupervised and an error in judgment-or even mere
inattentiveness-can cause severe injury to others.2"5 As one arbitra-
tor noted: "[I1t is my finding that even though there is something
inherently offensive about the type of testing required by the rule, the
balancing of the public interest in this case favors the imposition of
the rule."'2
76
Absent collective bargaining provisions to the contrary, arbitra-
tors have essentially given management the right to implement drug
testing unilaterally. This right, however, is not absolute. Arbitrators
have constrained this right by applying a notion of reasonableness
pursuant to a contractual "just cause" provision or similar language
that protects employees. It is by way of this constraint upon employ-
ers that arbitrators have emphasized the rights of employees: a right
to reasonable privacy, a right to be treated fairly, and a right to be free
from discriminatory or arbitrary treatment.
Thus, arbitrators examine drug testing programs in view of their
reasonableness by balancing the needs of health and safety in the
workplace against the privacy and fairness concerns of an
employee.277 In Hopeman Brothers, Inc.,278 the arbitrator balanced
the opposing interests:
Two primary factors must be recognized in current industrial
society, first, that alcohol and illicit drug use and abuse constitute a
significant safety hazard in the workplace and, second, that our
medical procedures are not as yet infallible. We are, therefore,
required to balance the needs and hazards of a safe workplace
against our deep and abiding concern for individual privacy.2 7 1
Similarly, in recent federal decisions such as Transport Workers'
Union, Local 234 v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Author-
ity (SEPTA),28° Rushton v. Nebraska Public Power District,2 1' and
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,282 the federal courts
275. See International Bhd of Elec. Workers, 87-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8570, at
6321.
276. Id.
277. See, e.g., CFS Continental, Inc., 86-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) $ 8070, at 3297-98
(1985) (Lumbley, Arb.).
278. 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 373 (1986) (Rothschild, Arb.).
279. Id. at 385; see also Utility Workers Union, Local No. 387, 89-2 Lab. Arb. Awards
(CCH) 8406, at 4997 (1989) (Fraser, Arb.) ("[T]he task of the Arbitrator is to strike the
proper balance between the competing interests: the Company's concern with ... maintaining
a drug-free workplace, and with its responsibility to its employees and the public; and the
Union's concern with its contractual rights and the employee's expectation of privacy.").
280. 863 F.2d 1110 (3d Cir. 1988), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 109 S. Ct. 3208
(1989).
281. 844 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1988).
282. 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
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have performed a balancing of interests to determine if the drug test,
which they defined as a search, was reasonable under the fourth
amendment.28 3
Likewise, a strong comparison can be made between procedural
and fairness issues raised by arbitrators and by courts. For example,
the arbitrator in Day & Zimmermann, Inc. 284 stated: "[T]he Grievant,
as a private employee, is not directly subject to [fourth amendment
search and seizure] constitutional guarantees. However, Arbitrators
have always considered the just cause protection of collective bargain-
ing agreements to include basic notions of due process as to individual
employee rights and protection against unreasonable employer
action. ' 285 Another arbitrator stated that it must be proved that "the
testing procedures were reliable and proper. '2 6 On the judicial side,
the Rushton court went to great lengths to examine the validity of the
drug testing program under procedural and substantive due process
analyses pursuant to the fourteenth amendment.287 The court looked
at both the procedures used to insure that the chain of custody of a
test specimen was reliable and the propriety of the consequences to an
employee who tested positive.288 The court noted: "Substantive due
process provides a shield against arbitrary and capricious deprivation
of liberty. . . . [Tihe evidence shows that the EMIT procedure [a
chemical process by which the sample is tested for drug content] uti-
lized in conjunction with such confirmatory tests as gas chromatogra-
phy/mass spectrometry is accurate and reliable. 289
Arbitrators occasionally go beyond implicitly following the rea-
soning of the courts, and they do so explicitly.29° In Department of
the Army,29' for example, the arbitrator deciding the reasonableness
of the drug testing of certain civilian employees actually stated that
his reasoning was primarily based on federal precedent:
The Arbitrator employs three controlling principles adopted by
District and Circuit Courts across the land in reaching his determi-
283. E.g., Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1390; SEPTA, 863 F.2d at 1118; Rushton, 844 F.2d at
566; see also supra notes 40-41.
284. 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1001 (1987) (Heinsz, Arb.).
285. Id. at 1008.
286. Metropolitan Transit Auth., 87-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8472, at 5873 (1987)
(Baroni, Arb.).
287. Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 653 F. Supp. 1510, 1525-27 (D. Neb. 1987),
aff'd, 844 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1988).
288. Id.
289. Id. at 1525.
290. See, e.g., Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 89-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8117, at
3588 (1988) (Jones, Arb.) (The arbitrator expressed that "[i]n this arbitration, the precepts of
the Fourth Amendment are directly implicated.").
291. 91 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 137 (1988) (Hufficut, Arb.).
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nation of unconstitutionality: First, compulsory urinalysis of pub-
lic sector employees qualifies as a search and seizure within the
structure of the 4th Amendment. Second, such a search must be a
reasonable one, grounded on specific facts that give rise, except
where privacy interests are minimal, to a reasonable suspicion
directed to the individual being searched, that is individualized sus-
picion. Where there is no suspicion involved, reasonableness must
be assessed by evaluating the need to search and the effectiveness of
the search. Third, if the search is not a reasonable one, exaction of
a spurious consent will not make it so.292
V. CONCLUSION
Arbitrators, although not always explicitly, give strong weight to
judicial precedents in deciding complex drug testing cases, as evi-
denced by the similarities between the judicial and arbitral opinions.
Private sector employees are enjoying many of the same substantive
and procedural rights that their public sector brethren enjoy, and the
private sector employees may arguably be better off because arbitra-
tors are not constrained by precedent. The tension between the
notions of safety in the workplace and the privacy rights of an
employee is slowly shifting in favor of society's desire to eradicate
drugs, a desire evidenced within the federal judicial opinions. If the
scales of the federal judiciary continue to shift so as to place more
weight on societal concerns and less weight on individual rights and
liberties, then arbitrators in the private sector are likely to follow.
GEOFFREY T. KIRK
292. Id. at 151 (citations omitted). In examining the totality of the program (including its
purpose, effectiveness, and application in this case), the arbitrator concluded that the drug test
was an unreasonable search and seizure. Id. at 154.
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